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ABSTRACT 
Steven Benjamin Spivack: The Impact of Medicare Readmission Reduction Policies on 
Patients, Primary Care Practices, and Hospitals 
(Under the direction of Jonathan Oberlander) 
 
Objective: To evaluate the impact of Medicare’s readmission reduction policies 
on patients, primary care practices, and hospitals.  
 Methods: I employed distinct methods to examine the effect of Medicare’s 
readmission reduction policies on each of the three groups identified in my objective. 
For patients, I used 2007-2014 admission-level data from California, Florida, and New 
York to create triple differences models investigating whether the Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program led to spillover for Medicare Advantage patients. For 
primary care practices, I combined the 2017-2018 National Survey of Healthcare 
Organizations and Systems with 100% 2015-2016 Medicare claims data to assess the 
relationship between practices’ readmission reduction activities and readmission rates 
for their patients using both mixed effects and linear regression models. For hospitals, I 
merged 2013-2018 Hospital Compare data and CMS’s annual impact files for the same 
timeframe to estimate fixed effects models to examine whether hospitals facing 
potentially larger readmission payment penalties had fewer excess readmissions. 
 Results: Readmission rates for Medicare Advantage patients dropped by one 
percentage point for acute myocardial infarction (P < .001) and half a percentage point 
for heart failure (P < .01) after the implementation of the Hospital Readmissions
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Reduction Program, indicating the presence of spillover. Primary care practices’ number 
of readmission reduction activities was significantly associated (P < .05) with lower 
readmission rates. On average, practices experienced a 0.05 percentage point 
decrease in readmission rates for each additional activity. Hospitals facing larger 
potential readmission payment penalties did not have significantly fewer excess 
readmissions. 
Conclusions: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program led to significant 
declines in readmission rates for Medicare Advantage patients, whom comprise a 
growing share of Medicare enrollees. Primary care practices might be able to lower 
readmission rates for their patients by engaging in large numbers of readmission 
reduction activities. Finally, while the financial incentives associated with the Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program may have acted as a triggering mechanism to signal 
hospitals on the need to reduce readmissions, I did not observe a direct relationship 
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Hospital readmissions have long been recognized as important markers of both 
quality and resource use.1,2 In response to mounting concerns about readmissions, 
federal policymakers have introduced readmission measures into pay-for-performance 
(P4P) and value-based purchasing programs for Traditional Medicare (TM) 
beneficiaries. The 2010 Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), part of the 
Affordable Care Act, represented a milestone in such efforts.3 Since then, Medicare has 
expanded the number and types of readmission measures as part of its payment 
reforms. In addition to hospitals, Medicare readmission measures now encompass 
skilled nursing facilities,4 home health care agencies,5 dialysis facilities,6 physicians and 
practices,7 and accountable care organizations.8  
The rise of Medicare readmission reduction policies has led to a burgeoning 
literature on readmissions. Almost all of this research has focused on the effects of the 
HRRP, since Medicare programs targeting other areas of the health system are much 
newer and have yet to be fully implemented. There is also a smaller, but expanding, 
subset of articles that examine the types of activities providers can implement that may 
help reduce readmissions. Below I summarize the findings from the literature and the 




Much of the evidence regarding the HRRP’s impact on readmissions suggests 
that the program significantly reduced readmission rates for Medicare patients.9,10 As a 
result, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission has declared the HRRP a 
“success.”11 The majority of these reductions were experienced by TM beneficiaries 
admitted for the three conditions initially targeted by the HRRP: acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI), heart failure (HF), and pneumonia (PN).12 Depending on the study, the 
HRRP has been credited with causing a drop in readmission rates of one to three 
percentage points for each of these three conditions.10,12–15 Additional research 
indicates that the HRRP also caused readmission rates to fall for other groups of 
patients. This includes TM beneficiaries hospitalized for conditions not targeted by the 
HRRP,9,15–18 privately insured persons,15,18–20 and Medicaid enrollees.9,20  
The findings above suggest that the HRRP is the reason for patients 
experiencing lower readmission rates. However, more recent work has called that 
conclusion into question. While these studies do not deny an overall drop in 
readmissions since the HRRP’s introduction, they contend that too much credit has 
been given to the program. One possible explanation for the drop in readmission rates 
after the HRRP’s implementation could be regression to the mean.21 Joshi et al. argue 
that most of the decline in readmission was driven by hospitals with the highest 
readmission rates, which they contend would have occurred irrespective of the HRRP. 
Thus, random chance, and not the HRRP, could explain lower readmission rates 
following the HRRP’s introduction.  
The HRRP’s effect may also be overstated due to changes in coding patterns.22 
Ody et al. found that readmission rates dropped the most for hospitals coding a larger 
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number of secondary diagnoses for admitted patients. Hospitals were able to increase 
the number of secondary diagnoses in claims because of another policy that was 
introduced around the same time as HRRP’s enactment. Readmission rates may also 
have declined due to increases in observation stays.23 Observation stays do not count 
as readmissions, and hospitals could be using them to treat patients without formally 
admitting them. Although observation stays have risen since the introduction of the 
HRRP, they have not risen enough to completely explain away lower readmission rates 
during this period.10  
There are also concerns about the trajectory of HRRP. The declines in hospital 
readmissions for Medicare beneficiaries came largely in the program’s first few years. 
Newer years of data indicate a plateauing of readmission rates for Medicare patients 
since 2017.9,10,24 Earlier declines in readmissions thus may not be sustainable and it is 
uncertain whether the HRRP can achieve additional reductions in coming years.  
Beyond the possibility that the HRRP’s success has been overstated, there are 
also concerns regarding unintended consequences. Recent work by Wadhera et al. 
and Samarghandi and Qayyum suggests that patients admitted for conditions targeted 
by the HRRP may be experiencing increases in mortality rates.25,26 Hospitals delaying 
or avoiding readmitting patients in order to reduce readmissions could lead to deaths for 
some patients. However, the literature on this topic is inconclusive with other studies 
refuting this finding.24,27 Nevertheless, Medicare has publicly stated it is “committed to 
monitoring” this topic in case the HRRP is causing an increase in mortality rates.28  
Another unintended consequence that has garnered much attention is the fact 
that the HRRP appears to be disproportionately penalizing hospitals that care for more 
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low socioeconomic status (SES) patients. While the measures in the HRRP adjust for 
patients’ clinical factors, they do not account for SES variables like race, income, or 
education. These variables are important in predicting readmission, even when 
accounting for baseline comorbidities.29,30 As a result, safety-net hospitals and hospitals 
caring for more minorities or dual-eligible patients have received disproportionately 
higher HRRP payment penalties.31–34 While readmission rates for hospitals caring for 
more low-SES patients have declined since the HRRP’s introduction, reductions have 
not matched the pace of hospitals caring for fewer low-SES patients. 35,36 Since 
hospitals have little control over their patient mix, a more equitable approach to the 
HRRP measures would to adjust for patient SES.37 Medicare was initially unwilling to 
adjust HRRP measures for SES but has since compromised to only compare 
readmission rates for hospitals caring for similar proportions of dual-eligible patients. As 
a result, the gap in payment penalties between hospitals caring for fewer or more low-
SES patients has shrunk substantially, although not completely.38 
Lastly, because of the increased attention to readmissions by providers, payers, 
and policymakers, there has also been a rise in research on the topic of how to reduce 
readmissions. This field originated with the care transitions literature which investigates 
how to reduce readmissions across episodes of care.39–41 These are largely multi-
component interventions that demonstrated the effectiveness of care managers, proper 
discharge planning, medication reconciliation, conducting home visits, along with 
several other tasks, as a group of activities that could help reduce readmission rates 
when they are combined in a single package. After the HRRP’s enactment, much of the 
work in this field then shifted to identifying activities and strategies that could be 
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implemented at the hospital level, especially care transitions interventions. 42–44 
Hospitals that performed the best on readmissions did so by implementing as many of 
these activities as possible.45  
 Even with this rather deep research pool on the topic of readmissions, there still 
remain important gaps that have not been addressed. Specifically, three topics have not 
received nearly as much attention as those cited above. First, we still know very little 
about how the size and structure of the HRRP’s payment penalties influence hospitals’ 
performance on readmissions. Second, while there have been numerous studies 
examining HRRP spillover, almost all of these studies have focused on privately insured 
or TM patients. Much less is known about spillover for Medicare Advantage (MA) 
patients, who are not subject to the HRRP. Third, while we know a lot about the types of 
strategies hospitals can use to reduce readmissions, little is known about how primary 
care practices (PCPs) can lower readmission rates for their patients. PCPs play an 
important role in reducing readmissions, and the inclusion of a readmission measure in 
the Quality Payment Program (QPP) means that these practices may face payment 
adjustments depending on their readmission performance. 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine these gaps in the readmission 
reduction literature. In doing so, I aim to shed light on: 1) how financial incentives may 
impact hospital readmissions; 2) the effects of the HRRP on MA patients; and 3) the 
types of PCP activities that might help reduce readmission rates. While each of these 
topics are unique, they are all motivated by advancing our understanding of the impact 
of Medicare readmission policies on patients, practices, and hospitals.  
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 Next, I provide a high-level summary of each of my three aims. I briefly describe 
the significance and contribution of each aim, detail my hypothesis and conceptual 
model, and review my methods and main findings. 
 
  
Aim 1: The Role of Incentive Size when Paying for Performance: The Hospital 
Readmissions Reduction Program 
 
Significance and Contribution 
We know from prior studies that the impact of financial incentives in health care 
is mixed at best.46,47 Yet Medicare, among other payers, has embraced the concept of 
P4P in a variety of value-based purchasing programs. One of Medicare’s most well-
known P4P programs is the HRRP. It reduces hospitals’ Medicare reimbursement rates 
by up to three percent based on their number of excess readmissions for select 
conditions.3 While the HRRP has been touted as a success by Medicare administrators 
and policy analysts because of declines in Medicare readmission rates that followed its 
introduction,10,48,49 it remains unclear how much of this success was due to the size of 
the HRRP’s payment penalties. We do not know whether hospitals facing larger 
potential penalties because they care for more Medicare patients reduce readmissions 
more than hospitals facing smaller penalties. This aim addresses that gap and thereby 
adds to the literature on the HRRP as well as the larger P4P evidence base examining 
the relationship between financial incentives and performance. 
 
Central Hypothesis 
I expect a significant negative relationship between the size of a hospital’s HRRP 
payment penalty and their AMI, HF, and PN Excess Readmission Ratios (ERRs). I 
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hypothesize that hospitals’ ERRs will drop as their maximum potential HRRP payment 
penalty per admission rises.  
 
Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model for this aim is RAND’s Value-Based Purchasing 
Conceptual Framework (Figure 1).50 I rely on this model to examine how the HRRP’s 
negative payment adjustments impact the intermediate effects of the program, which I 
define as reducing excess readmissions. I test my hypothesis that this relationship is 
mediated by the potential size of hospitals’ negative payment adjustments. The strength 
of this relationship increases as Medicare consumes a larger proportion of a hospital’s 
payer mix, which is represented by the “mix of populations served” bullet in the 
“characteristics of providers and practice settings” box in Figure 1. The conceptual 
model also details other provider characteristics that can influence the relationship 
between the HRRP’s payment adjustments and hospital performance on readmissions. 




I use two publicly available datasets for the years 2013-2018 in order to examine 
the relationship between hospitals’ potential maximum HRRP payment adjustments and 
their performance on readmissions. The first is the Hospital Compare website, which 
publishes information on each hospital’s rate of excess readmissions. The second is 
CMS’s annual impact files, which include information on hospital payer mix as well as 
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provider characteristics like teaching status and number of beds. I merge these two data 
sources using the Provider ID variable for each hospital.  
 
Sample 
I include hospitals that are subject to the HRRP, specifically, short-term acute-
care inpatient hospitals. I then create hospital-level, condition-specific cohorts for AMI, 
HF, and PN. ERRs had to be present for a condition for all six years of data in order for 
a hospital to be included in a cohort. Thus, hospitals can be included in one condition 
cohort but not another if they were missing an ERR for at least one condition in one or 
more years of data. 
 
Key Variables and Measures 
My outcome for this aim is hospitals’ ERR for the three conditions included since 
the beginning of the HRRP: AMI, HF, and PN. A ratio of one indicates average 
performance. A ratio below one signifies better performance and a ratio above one 
indicates worse performance. The further the ratio from one the stronger the indicator of 
good or poor performance. My independent variable is hospitals’ maximum potential 
HRRP payment penalty per admission. This variable represents the maximum amount a 








I use fixed effects models to investigate the relationship between a hospital’s 
maximum potential HRRP payment penalty per admission and their ERRs for AMI, HF, 
and PN. I run three models, one for each condition-cohort. 
 
Main Findings 
 Unadjusted readmission rates dropped substantially for AMI, HF, and PN after 
the implementation of the HRRP. The majority of the decline in readmissions occurred 
between 2013-2016, with much more modest changes in 2017 and 2018. Facing 
potentially larger HRRP payment penalties per admission was not significantly 
associated with lower ERRs for AMI, HF, or PN. The fact that actual HRRP penalties 
are much smaller than the three percent maximum may explain why I did not observe a 
relationship between potential incentive size and performance on readmissions.   
 
Aim 2: The Impact of The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program on Medicare  
Advantage Patients: A Retrospective Study of Three Large States 
 
Significance and Contribution 
 Since the HRRP’s implementation, Medicare readmission rates have declined 
substantially for TM patients hospitalized for conditions targeted by the program.10,12 
There is also evidence of spillover as Medicare readmission rates have dropped for TM 
patients hospitalized for conditions not targeted by the program.14,15 Moreover, privately 
insured and Medicaid patients have also experienced lower readmission rates since the 
implementation of the HRRP.9,18 However, one patient population that has not been 
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studied as extensively is MA enrollees. Although they are Medicare beneficiaries, the 
HRRP does not apply to them since they are not enrolled in TM. Therefore, this patient 
population serves as an important control group as they are more similar to the TM 
population in age and other characteristics than privately insured or Medicaid patients. 
Yet, few studies have investigated MA readmission rates since the HRRP’s 
implementation, possibly because MA data can be more difficult to obtain. With MA 
enrollment projected to reach almost 50% by 2030 it is increasingly important to 
understand how TM policies are impacting MA patients.51 This aim will advance our 
relatively scant knowledge of the HRRP’s effects on MA patients by examining spillover 
effects for MA patients hospitalized in California, Florida, and New York. The findings 
will enable a richer understanding of the HRRP’s effects on non-TM patient populations. 
 
Central Hypothesis 
The HRRP has also led to significant reductions in readmission rates for MA 
patients, indicating the presence of spillover effects.  
 
Conceptual Model 
This aim is based on the same conceptual model as the one I use in my first aim 
(Figure 1).50 For this aim, the model elucidates how a program like the HRRP can also 
reduce readmission rates for other payers and populations due to the “spillover effects” 
bullet in the “intermediate effects” category. For the purposes of this aim, spillover 
effects are defined as reductions in readmission rates for MA patients. Similar to my first 
aim, this model also informs the types of covariates to include in models investigating 
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spillover effects. In addition, the conceptual model displays external factors that can 
also lead to spillover effects. These examples of external factors are key when deciding 
on the proper control group to detect spillover effects. 
 
Data Source 
I use data from four sources to test my hypothesis. The first source is comprised 
of various State Inpatient Databases, which are 100% inpatient claims data made 
available by the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project. For this study, I use New York 
and Florida data from 2007 through 2014 and California data from 2007-2011. Since 
California halted its participation in the State Inpatient Databases after 2011, I also 
obtain California’s Patient Discharge Data from 2012-2014. These data are used to 
populate previous years of the State Inpatient Databases and also include 100% of 
inpatient claims. The final two datasets are the 2012-2014 Urban Influence Codes and 
the 2012-2014 American Community Survey owned by the Census Bureau in order to 
include additional socioeconomic variables present in State Inpatient Databases but not 
the Patient Discharge Data. 
 
Sample 
I include admissions for TM and MA patients 65 and older admitted to short-term, 






Key Variables and Measures 
The outcome for this aim is unplanned 30-day readmissions. A readmission is 
defined as any unplanned hospitalization that occurs within 30 days of a previous index 
admission. Readmissions are categorized as dichotomous, meaning each index 
admission can have no more than one readmission. I distinguish between TM and MA 
admissions based on the primary expected payer variable. 
 
Data Analysis 
I construct triple difference-in-differences models to examine AMI, HF, and PN 
readmission rates for TM and MA admissions before and after implementation of the 
HRRP (2007-2011 vs. 2012-2014). I compare readmission rates for three groups of 
admissions, TM admissions for AMI, HF, or PN, TM admissions for non-targeted 
conditions (NTCs), and MA admissions for AMI, HF, or PN. I designated MA admissions 
for NTCs as the control group. 
 
Main Findings 
 The HRRP resulted in significant spillover for MA readmission rates. MA patients 
admitted for AMI and HF experienced statistically significant declines in readmissions 
after the implementation of the HRRP. PN readmission rates for MA patients did not 
change significantly after the HRRP was implemented. The size of this effect depends 
on how much spillover is attributed to the control group, MA patients admitted for NTCs. 
The more the HRRP is credited for reducing MA NTC readmission rates the larger the 




Aim 3: The Association of Readmission Reduction Activities with Primary Care  
Practice Readmission Rates 
 
Significance and Contribution 
The increased emphasis on readmissions in health policy has led to novel 
research on the types of activities that can help to reduce readmissions. The majority of 
these studies has focused on hospital strategies associated with reducing readmissions, 
since hospitals have been the main target of Medicare’s readmission reduction 
policies.44,45 Yet hospitals are not the only care setting responsible for preventing 
patients from being readmitted. PCPs also play an integral role in this process. 
However, we know much less about the types of primary care activities that can help 
lower readmission rates for their patients.52 While it is possible that many of the 
hospital-based strategies apply to a primary care setting, it is also conceivable that 
interventions that work in one care setting are not easily adapted in other settings.53 
Therefore, what remains to be tested is whether certain activities proven to be effective 
in hospitals can also help to reduce readmissions in PCPs. Not only is this question 
clinically relevant, it is also policy relevant since many practices face the possibility of 
payment adjustments due to poor performance on the readmission measure included in 
the QPP.54 This aim will strengthen the readmission reduction strategies literature by 








Engaging in more readmission reduction activities will be associated with lower 
PCP-level readmission rates.  
 
Conceptual Model 
I construct a conceptual model to illustrate the types of activities that PCPs can 
employ to reduce readmission rates for their patients (Figure 2). This model is based on 
prior literature demonstrating readmission reduction activities found to be effective in 
other care settings. The model is composed of activities in four care domains: 1) care 
management; 2) patient education; 3) addressing social needs; 4) using data for quality 
improvement. Practices are more likely to reduce their patients’ readmission rates as 
they engage in more of these activities. Readmission rates are also influenced by 
patient and organizational factors outside of a practice’s control. 
 
Data Source 
I use data from two sources. The first is the 2017-2018 National Survey of 
Healthcare Organizations and Systems. This is a survey of health systems, hospitals, 
and PCPs. For the purposes of this aim, I only use the practice survey. The survey used 
a stratified cluster sampling design to sample practices within and outside of health 
systems. The practice survey includes questions on a variety of topics, including care 
transitions and readmission reduction activities. I also use 100% Medicare claims data 





I include practices that responded to the survey that have at least 25 Medicare 
admissions during 2016. I include admissions for TM patients in these practices who are 
65 and older admitted for any reason to a short-term, acute-care inpatient hospital. 
 
Key Variables and Measures 
The outcome for this aim is practices’ risk-standardized readmission rate 
(RSRR). This is a continuous variable ranging from 0-100 that adjusts for patient and 
practice-level factors. The independent variable is practices’ scores on a composite 
measure representing the number of readmission activities that a practice regularly 
conducts. This composite measure includes practices’ responses on 12 readmission 
reduction activities. The composite score is standardized and ranges between 0-1, with 




I calculate practices readmission rates using a mixed-effects logistic regression 
model adjusting for patient race, income, frailty, and comorbidities. I then construct a 
linear regression model to examine the association between practices’ readmission 







 Practices’ scores on the readmission reduction activities composite measure was 
significantly associated with lower RSRRs. Practices’ RSRRs declined as they engaged 
in more of these activities. Practices employing more than 20 physicians, practices 
operating in urban areas, and practices caring for fewer dual-eligible patients also 
experienced lower RSRRs on average.  
 
Organization of Dissertation 
 
The rest of this dissertation is composed of three papers and a conclusion. 
Chapter 2 examines the relationship between the size and structure of the HRRP’s 
payment penalties and hospital performance on readmissions. Chapter 3 investigates 
whether the HRRP has also lowered readmission rates for MA patients. Chapter 4 
explores the relationship between PCPs’ readmission reduction activities and their 
patients’ readmission rates. Chapter 5 then summarizes my findings and details policy 














CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF INCENTIVE SIZE WHEN PAYING FOR 





Background: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) cuts 
hospitals’ Medicare payments by up to three percent for high numbers of excess 
readmissions. As hospitals become more dependent on Medicare revenue their 
financial incentives to lower excess readmissions (ERRs) increase because the HRRP 
only targets Medicare payments.  
Objective: To examine the relationship between hospitals’ maximum potential 
HRRP payment penalty per admission and their acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart 
failure (HF) and pneumonia (PN) ERRs. 
Methods: We used data from Hospital Compare and CMS’s annual impact files 
to create balanced panels of hospital-level, condition-based cohorts from 2013-2018: 
our final sample included 1,486 hospitals for AMI, 2,500 for HF, and 2,504 for PN. We 
estimated fixed effects models to examine the relationship between hospitals’ maximum 
potential HRRP payment penalty per admission and their ERRs.  
Results: Hospitals in the highest quintile of maximum potential HRRP payment penalty 
per admission had fewer index admissions, were smaller, and were less likely to be 
urban, teaching, or a disproportionate share hospital than hospitals in the lowest
 quintile. We found no significant association between hospitals’ maximum potential 
HRRP payment penalty per admission and their ERRs.  
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Conclusion: The relatively small penalties associated with the HRRP may have 
acted as a trigger event, encouraging all hospitals to reduce ERRs without incentivizing 
differential effects based on potential penalty size. A leveling off of ERRs in recent years 






Pay-for-performance (P4P) is an increasingly common method for reimbursing 
medical providers. Policymakers have sought to leverage the use of financial rewards 
and penalties to influence provider behavior and achieve desired outcomes.55,56 The 
hope is, according to former Health and Human Services Secretary Sylvia Burwell, that 
“highly motivated and rewarded” providers will improve their quality of care and 
performance on metrics specified by payers.57 Furthermore, P4P has been advertised 
as a method for generating cost savings by motivating “higher-value care” among 
providers.58     
The rationale for P4P is straightforward: if we offer providers financial incentives 
to deliver better care, they will do so. Yet in practice P4P has often, though not always, 
produced disappointing results. One large systematic review of P4P in health care 
concluded that, “the evidence seems insufficient to recommend widespread 
implementation of P4P”.47 Another large multi-country review found, “low-strength, 
contradictory evidence” for P4P’s impact on processes of care and “no clear evidence” 
on its impact on patient outcomes.59 In the US, several of Medicare’s large P4P 
demonstrations failed to produce consistent quality improvements or significantly lower 
costs.55,60–62 Private P4P initiatives have had similar results.59,63 However, other 
programs, such as Medicare’s Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), 
have been touted as P4P success stories.9,20 
The lack of consistent findings supporting P4P raises a crucial question: how do 
providers respond to financial incentives? The answer is unclear, with no apparent 
correlation between the size of the incentive and the success of the P4P program.59 
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Moreover, studies that have examined the impact of incentive size on performance have 
typically done so at the macro level (e.g., did the program improve processes or 
outcomes overall).64,65 Fewer studies have investigated how performance is impacted 
by incentive size within a program. This is in part because P4P initiatives commonly rely 
on a uniform incentive amount for all providers, making it impossible to analyze within-
program effects. In contrast, Medicare’s more recent value-based purchasing initiatives 
often include payment adjustments that operate on a sliding scale. This allows 
researchers to investigate the dose response relationship between incentive size and 
performance in these programs. Moreover, as these programs are mandatory there is 
less concern about selection bias compared with voluntary P4P programs.  
One of Medicare’s programs that allows us to investigate the dose response 
relationship between incentive size and performance is the HRRP. Adopted in 2010 and 
implemented in 2012 for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure (HF) and 
pneumonia (PN), the HRRP targets over 3,500 U.S. hospitals by reducing their 
Medicare base operating payments by up to three percent for excess AMI, HF, and PN 
readmissions.3 Medicare determines the amount of excess readmissions for each 
hospital by calculating an excess readmission ratio (ERR) which is the number of 
predicted readmissions over the number of expected readmissions. A value below one 
means a hospital had lower than expected numbers of readmissions while values above 
one indicates increasing numbers of excess readmissions. Even if a hospital has zero 
excess readmissions for non-penalized conditions, like asthma, it can still see a 
decrease in Medicare reimbursement of up to three percent if its ERR is above one for 
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any of the HRRP measures. Thus, hospitals are incentivized by the HRRP to target 
readmission efforts more towards penalized conditions.  
Along with targeting select conditions, the HRRP reduces federal Medicare 
payments. Therefore, hospitals more dependent on Medicare revenue face greater 
financial incentive to prevent excess readmissions. A three percent reduction in 
Medicare payments for a hospital that sees few Medicare patients as an overall share of 
its admissions is a relatively smaller penalty than for a hospital more reliant on 
Medicare. Thus, the structure of the HRRP penalty formula allows us to compare ERRs 
based on the amount of revenue at risk of being penalized.  
Although several studies of the HRRP have indirectly examined this topic by 
controlling for hospitals’ percentage of Medicare patients in their readmission 
models,14,36,66,67 none has directly investigated how the size of hospitals’ potential 
HRRP penalty impacts ERRs. Furthermore, some studies have examined readmission 
rates longitudinally,10,12–14,17,18 but to our knowledge none has used multiple years of 
panel data to control for unobserved confounders. In order to address the question of 
how penalty size impacts ERRs, we used 2013-2018 CMS data to examine the 
relationship between hospitals’ maximum potential HRRP payment penalty per 
admission and their ERRs for AMI, HF and PN. We hypothesize that hospitals’ 
maximum potential payment penalty per admission is negatively correlated with their 








Study Data and Methods 
 
Data  
We used data from two sources to construct our hospital-level analysis file. The 
first was CMS’s annual impact files from fiscal years 2013-2018. These annual files are 
available online on the CMS website.68 The impact files contain hospital-level data for 
over 3,300 hospitals on core-based statistical area designation, teaching status, number 
of beds, disproportionate share (DSH) percentage, Medicare days, and HRRP payment 
penalty, among other variables. The second source was the Hospital Compare website 
which includes 2013-2018 readmission data for all subsection(d) hospitals*. These files 
contain such variables as hospitals’ ERRs, the number of index admissions and 
readmissions for each HRRP condition.  
 
Patient Cohorts 
After linking these two datasets using hospitals’ CMS provider number, we 
created three different cohorts by condition: AMI, HF, and PN. We included hospitals’ 
patients in the cohorts if they were continuously enrolled in Medicare parts A and B, 
aged 65 or older, and discharged alive (not against medical advice), as defined by 
CMS.69 To obtain a balanced panel for each of these cohorts, we excluded hospitals if 
they were missing readmission data or other important characteristics for any of the six 
years. After the exclusions, our final sample included 1,486 hospitals for AMI, 2,500 for 
                                                        
*Subsection (d) hospital are general, acute care, short-term hospitals and represent the vast majority of all hospitals in the US. 
Those hospitals that are not included as subsection (d) hospitals included Maryland hospitals, Veteran’s hospitals, critical access 
hospitals, cancer hospitals, children’s hospitals, and inpatient psychiatry hospitals. 
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HF, and 2,504 for PN. Our sample for AMI was smaller as fewer hospitals had the 
required 25 index admissions necessary to be included in the HRRP for AMI. 
 
Outcome 
Our dependent variable was hospitals’ ERR. CMS calculates ERRs by dividing a 
hospital’s predicted readmission rate over its expected readmission rate. The predicted 
readmission rate is based on the hospital’s patient characteristics (age and 
comorbidities) and their hospital intercept (e.g. the hospital’s performance on 
readmissions after accounting for its case mix). The expected readmission rate is based 
on the hospital’s patient characteristics and the overall mean hospital intercept.69 A 
readmission must occur within 30 days of an index admission in order to be counted as 
a readmission. Multiple readmissions within the 30-day window do not count more than 
once as the outcome is dichotomous. The ERR excludes a small subset of planned 
readmissions like maintenance chemotherapy. We recognized the possibility that ERRs 
can be potentially gamed through excess coding of secondary diagnoses.22 This is 
because the ERR formula presents hospitals with an opportunity to inflate their 
predicted readmission rate by listing a greater number of secondary diagnoses (up to 
25). We therefore conducted sensitivity analyses using raw readmission rates as the 
outcome while adjusting for patients’ hierarchical condition category score as an 
independent variable. The results of this model were nearly identical to the model using 






Our independent variable of interest was hospitals’ maximum potential HRRP 
payment penalty per admission. In order to arrive at this variable, we first calculated 
each hospital’s total Medicare revenue that was subject to HRRP penalties. The 
HRRP’s three percent penalty is only applied to the base operating payment amount, 
which is a flat rate for all hospitals, updated on a yearly basis. We multiplied the base 
rate amount (published each year in CMS’s final rules) by each hospital’s number of 
Medicare admissions for the year to arrive at a hospital’s total base operating revenue 
amount. We then multiplied this amount by three percent, the maximum HRRP penalty, 
to identify the largest potential amount a hospital could lose each year. Finally, we 
divided this figure by the total number of all admissions, not just Medicare, to obtain 
each hospital’s maximum revenue at risk per inpatient admission.  
 
Control Variables 
To control for hospitals caring for more disadvantaged patients, we used the 
DSH variable in the impact file, which is the percent of a hospital’s patients that meet 
DSH status. To account for hospital size, we included a continuous variable for the total 
number of beds. We did not include any time-invariant predictors in our model (e.g., 
teaching status or profit status) as these are controlled for by the fixed effects. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
 We first split hospitals into quintiles based on their average maximum HRRP 
penalty per admission for AMI, HF, and PN between fiscal years 2013-2018. We then 
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compared mean observed (non-risk adjusted) readmission rates for each quintile over 
time. Next, we restricted our sample to only hospitals in the lowest and highest quintiles 
of maximum HRRP penalty per admission for AMI, HF, and PN. We then compared the 
results for the two groups using t-tests for normally distributed continuous variables, 
Mann Whitney U tests for non-normally distributed continuous variables, and chi2 tests 
for binary and categorical variables. 
 We then constructed fixed effects models for all hospitals in our sample, using 
ordinary least squares regression in order to examine the impact of a hospital’s potential 
maximum HRRP penalty per admission on its AMI, HF, and PN ERRs between fiscal 
years 2013-2018. We tested for the use of pooled regression and random effects using 
Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests. The results of these tests supported the use of a 
fixed effects model over the other two models. We accounted for potential secular time 
trends by introducing a dummy variable for each year.  
 Finally, as a sensitivity analysis, we estimated a linear regression model using 
2018 data and changes in ERR from 2013-2018 as the dependent variable. The goal of 
this model was to examine if hospitals with greater potential maximum HRRP penalties 
per admission demonstrated more improvement in ERR over time. Since this was a 
cross-sectional model we added additional time-invariant covariates that we did not 
include in our fixed effects model. We included variables for hospital teaching status, 
urban/rural location, and region. We clustered all standard errors at the hospital level. 







Hospitals in all five quintiles of maximum HRRP penalty per admission 
experienced clinically significant declines in observed readmission rates for AMI, HF, 
and PN between 2013-2016 (Figure 1). However, these declines appear to have slowed 
down beginning in 2017. Overall, the greatest declines in observed readmission rates 
were for AMI (2.8%) and HF (2.6%), with PN displaying more modest reductions (1.5%). 
The trends in observed readmission rates were similar across quintiles of maximum 
HRRP penalty per admission. Compared to hospitals in the lowest quintile of maximum 
HRRP penalty per admission, readmission rates for hospitals in the highest quintile did 
drop more but this relationship was not significant for any of the three conditions (AMI: -
2.9% vs. -2.8%; HF: -2.9% vs. -2.4%; PN: -1.7% vs. -1.3%). 
We observed several significant differences between hospitals in the lowest and 
highest quintiles of maximum HRRP penalty per admission (Table 1). Hospitals in the 
highest quintile had significantly fewer total admissions (AMI: 3,930  vs. 4,386; HF: 
2,199 vs. 3,202; PN: 2,082 vs. 3,345) but significantly more Medicare admissions (AMI: 
2,476  vs. 1,277; HF: 1,220 vs. 779; PN: 1,161 vs. 836). Hospitals in the highest quintile 
received significantly higher average HRRP penalties (AMI: 0.53%  vs. 0.31%; HF: 
0.51% vs. 0.28%; PN: 0.52% vs. 0.30%) but, on average, hospitals in both groups were 
penalized some amount a similar number of years (five). On average, hospitals in the 
highest quintile of maximum HRRP penalty per admission had significantly lower 
proportions of DSH patients (AMI: 19%  vs 39%; HF: 21% vs. 37%; PN: 21% vs. 38%), 
fewer beds (AMI: 179  vs. 398; HF: 106 vs. 302; PN: 101 vs. 310), and lower casemix 
scores (AMI: 1.55  vs. 1.77; HF: 1.42 vs. 1.68; PN: 1.40 vs. 1.69). Hospitals in the 
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highest quintile were significantly less likely to be teaching hospitals (AMI: 26%  vs 70%; 
HF: 15% vs. 58%; PN: 14% vs. 57%), large urban (AMI: 28%  vs 69%; HF: 21% vs. 
69%; PN: 21% vs. 68%), or located in the West (AMI: 6%  vs 35%; HF: 5% vs. 36%; 
PN: 5% vs. 36%). We did not witness significant differences in observed readmission 
rates or ERRs for any of the conditions.  
We subsequently used fixed effects to model hospitals’ ERRs as a function of 
their maximum potential HRRP penalty per admission, DSH percentage, and number of 
beds (Table 2). A one dollar increase in hospitals’ maximum potential HRRP penalty per 
admission was associated with a 0.0002 increase in their AMI and PN ERRs and a 
0.0001 increase in their HF ERR. This relationship was not statistically significant for 
any of the three conditions. We did not observe a statistically significant relationship 
between hospitals’ DSH percentage or number of beds and their ERR.  
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
There was an inconsistent relationship between maximum potential HRRP 
penalty per admission and changes in hospitals’ ERR from 2013 to 2018. For AMI, the 
relationship was negative and statistically significant. As hospitals’ maximum potential 
HRRP penalty per admission increased their ERR decreased over time. We observed a 
reduction in ERR of 0.0005 points for each additional dollar in maximum potential HRRP 
penalty per admission. We did not detect a statistically significant relationship between 







 The HRRP has been championed by many health policymakers and analysts as 
a successful example of P4P, credited with reducing readmission rates. Readmission 
rates declined substantially over the first few years of the HRRP and have since begun 
to level off, a finding that we witnessed as well when examining observed readmission 
rates.10,70 Improved performance on readmissions does not appear to be driven by the 
size of the HRRP’s payment penalties. Our study found that the prospect of larger 
penalties was not consistently associated with lower ERRs. Although we did observe a 
significant association between hospitals’ maximum potential HRRP penalty per 
admission and improvement in ERR for AMI from 2013 to 2018, this was not true for HF 
or PN.  
Perhaps the most plausible explanation for this null finding is that HRRP 
penalties are too small to result in differential performance on excess readmissions. 
While some hospitals face the potential of millions of dollars in lost revenue if they are 
penalized the maximum three percent, the vast majority of hospitals are penalized less 
than one percent. In 2017, the average payment penalty was just over $200,000.70 
Some researchers have concluded that financial incentives must be large, up to 15%, in 
order to spur improvement but this does not seem to be supported by experiences with 
the HRRP.65 Instead, the modest penalties associated with the HRRP may have acted 
as a trigger event, encouraging all hospitals to reduce ERRs without incentivizing 
differential effects based on potential penalty size. It could be that the HRRP has 
sparked a cultural shift for all hospitals, with readmission reduction efforts signaling 
high-quality care. This shift may not have occurred if financial incentives, no matter how 
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small, were absent. A recent survey of nearly 1,000 hospitals found that almost two-
thirds of executives cited the HRRP as having a “significant” impact on their 
readmission reduction efforts.71  
From CMS’s perspective, the HRRP penalties appear to have had their desired 
effect of reducing excess readmissions,10,12,13,72 while also saving Medicare over $2 
billion since the program’s inception.70 However, some researchers dispute these 
findings, arguing that the success of the HRRP is a function of coding changes or 
regression to the mean and not the HRRP itself.21,22 Others contend that the program 
has led to increases in mortality rates.25 While these are serious concerns, the literature 
is divided on these claims.27 As with many P4P programs, unintended consequences 
can be just as important as the impact of the program itself. Our study did not 
investigate these topics but as the HRRP moves forward CMS must carefully monitor 
these issues.  
Moreover, declines in readmission rates have levelled off since 2016. This could 
be due to the fact that the easy gains in reducing excess readmissions have already 
been made. It could also be caused by regression to the mean, with declines in 
readmission rates mostly attributed to improvements in hospitals with the highest 
baseline rates.21 While the HRRP’s penalties may have been large enough to create a 
culture of readmission reduction, they may not be large enough to incentivize hospitals 
to invest the additional resources necessary to achieve further reductions in excess 
readmissions. If CMS believes this to be the case, then federal policymakers may want 
to examine the possibility of implementing larger payment penalties. 
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However, if excess readmissions are no longer being reduced because there is 
little room for additional improvement, then increasing the penalty size will not be an 
effective strategy. CMS has made it clear that the goal of the HRRP is not to “drive 
hospitals to a zero readmission rate.”73 If hospitals are in fact reaching a point of  
diminishing marginal returns, then the HRRP may not be able to shift the readmissions 
curve much further to the left. However, CMS can still leverage the program to shrink 
the distribution of the curve. One approach could be to reserve some of the HRRP 
penalties and allocate them to training/educational materials for hospitals with 
consistently high numbers of excess readmissions through programs like the 
Partnership for Patients. We have evidence on the types of activities and interventions 
associated with lower excess readmissions and it may be that consistently poor 
preforming hospitals could improve their performance by implementing these strategies 
more regularly.44,45  
 
Limitations 
One limitation of our study is that we used retrospective data, thus our study may 
not properly control for unobserved confounders. We attempted to mitigate this 
limitation by using a fixed effects model. Fixed effects can control for unobserved 
characteristics like hospital revenue sources but only if they do not change significantly 
over the study period. Therefore, if hospitals, or certain subsets of hospitals, have 
experienced impactful changes in their inpatient/outpatient revenue share, our model 
may not properly control for these types of factors. Another limitation of our study is that 
we did not have access to hospitals’ all-payer revenue data. We attempted to account 
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for hospitals’ reliance on Medicare revenue through the use of a maximum potential 
HRRP penalty per admission variable. However, it may have been more appropriate to 
calculate hospitals’ revenue at risk as a proportion of their Medicare revenue over their 
total revenue, something we were unable to do. Lastly, while payer mix is an important 
variable in terms of the amount of revenue at risk for hospitals under the HRRP, it is 
something hospitals have little control over. Consequently, it may be that hospitals are 





 We found that the size of hospitals’ potential payment penalty under the HRRP 
was not associated with their ERR. In practice, this finding suggests that hospital 
performance in the HRRP is not being dictated by the size of the incentive. However, 
given the initial success of the HRRP in reducing excess readmissions, we cannot 
discount the role of incentives as a triggering mechanism that encouraged all hospitals 
to perform better. Concerns about possible gaming and the impact of the HRRP on 
mortality rates suggests that CMS may need to closely monitor the HRRP moving 
forward. Additionally, recent slowdowns in the readmission reduction trend may 




Table 1. Hospital Characteristics by Lowest and Highest Quintile of Maximum 
HRRP Penalty Per Admission, FY 2013-2018 
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(29.2%) 17 (3.4%) 
246 
(49.2%) 23 (4.6%) 
259 
(51.8%) 






































(35.4%) 19 (6.4%) 
178 
(35.6%) 24 (4.8%) 
181 
(36.1%) 25 (5.0%) 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from FY 2013-2018 CMS annual impact files and Hospital Compare 
data. Notes: We split hospitals into quintiles based on their mean maximum HRRP penalty per 
admission. We conducted comparisons of continuous variables using non-parametric tests for right-
skewed variables and t tests for normally distributed variables. We used chi-squared tests to compare 







Table 2. Fixed Effects Regression Model Results for Excess Readmission Ratios 
for AMI, HF, PN, FY 2013-2018 
 AMI HF PN 





0.0002 0.0002 0.196 0.0001 0.0001 0.138 0.0002 0.0001 0.061 
DSH % -0.0002 0.0003 0.535 0.0001 0.0002 0.514 0.00001 0.00002 0.963 
Number of 
beds 0.00003 0.00004 0.466 0.00005 0.00003 0.099 0.00005 0.00003 0.086 
Year (2013 
reference) 
         
2014 0.002 0.002 0.194 0.002 0.001 0.091 0.001 0.001 0.254 
2015 0.004 0.002 0.051 0.002 0.001 0.108 0.002 0.001 0.115 
2016 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.023 0.004 0.002 0.117 
2017 0.008 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.014 0.005 0.002 0.014 
2018 0.007 0.003 0.022 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.024 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from FY 2013-2018 CMS annual impact files and Hospital Compare 





Table 3. OLS Model Results for Differences in Excess Readmission Ratios between 2013-2018 for AMI, HF, PN, FY 
 AMI HF PN 
 Coef. SE P Val Coef. SE P Val Coef. SE P Val 
Max HRRP penalty per 
admit ($) -0.0005 0.00018 0.011 -0.00018 0.00012 0.131 0.00005 0.00012 0.697 
DSH % -0.0009 0.00020 <0.001 0.00006 0.00013 0.647 0.00029 0.00013 0.031 
Number of beds -0.00002 0.00001 0.273 -0.00002 0.00001 0.066 0.000003 0.00001 0.775 
Teaching -0.0059 0.00563 0.296 0.00518 0.00426 0.224 -0.00307 0.00450 0.495 
Large Urban          
Urban 0.02182 0.00583 <0.001 0.01239 0.00428 0.004 0.00485 0.00445 0.275 
Rural 0.02419 0.00696 0.001 0.00416 0.00492 0.398 -0.00387 0.00508 0.446 
Northeast          
Midwest 0.02809 0.00727 <0.001 0.01983 0.00558 <0.001 -0.00597 0.00557 0.284 
South 0.02381 0.00765 0.002 0.01073 0.00577 0.063 -0.00707 0.00569 0.215 
West 0.03895 0.00862 <0.001 0.01687 0.00644 0.009 0.00123 0.00660 0.852 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from FY 2013-2018 CMS annual impact files and Hospital Compare data. Notes: We used ordinary least 









Figure 3. Observed AMI, HF, and PN Readmission Rates by Quintile of Max 
Potential HRRP Penalty per Admission FY 2013-2018 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from FY 2013-2018 CMS annual impact files and Hospital Compare 
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CHAPTER 3. THE IMPACT OF THE HOSPITAL READMISSIONS REDUCTION 
PROGRAM ON MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PATIENTS: A RETROSPECTIVE STUDY 





Background: The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) has been 
credited with reducing readmissions for Traditional Medicare (TM) but less is known 
about the program’s impact on Medicare Advantage (MA).  
Objective: Determine whether the HRRP reduced MA readmission rates. 
Methods: We compared readmission rates for three groups: targeted conditions 
for TM and MA and non-targeted conditions for TM, using MA admissions for non-
targeted conditions as our control. We constructed triple differences linear probability 
models examining changes in unplanned readmission rates before and after the HRRP. 
Results: Post-HRRP readmission rates dropped by the same amount for TM and 
MA for AMI (1.0 percentage points) and HF (0.5 percentage points). There was no 
statistically significant change in TM or MA pneumonia readmission rates or TM 
readmission rates for non-targeted conditions. 
Conclusion: We found significant evidence of HRRP spillover for MA patients. 






Congress enacted the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) with 
the goal of reducing readmission rates for Medicare patients. The HRRP was one of 
several payment reforms created by the Affordable Care Act to improve quality and 
reduce Medicare spending growth. The HRRP reduces hospitals' Medicare payments 
by up to three percent for higher-than-expected readmission rates for Traditional 
Medicare (TM) patients admitted for select conditions. Over time, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has expanded the list of conditions from the 
original three, acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure (HF), and pneumonia 
(PN), to a total of six. Much of the research to date has focused on the effect of the 
HRRP on TM beneficiaries but less is known about its effects on Medicare Advantage 
(MA) patients.  
Under MA, Medicare contracts with an insurer that receives a fixed amount of 
money for each enrollee. MA’s capitated reimbursement structure incentivizes health 
plans to reduce excess hospitals readmissions. Medicare beneficiaries are attracted to 
MA largely because of the enhanced benefits that most plans offer.74 MA enrollment has 
grown substantially over the past decade from 10.5 million persons in 2009 to 22 million 
in 2019.51 Given that growth, it is crucial to understand how hospital readmission 
policies are impacting MA patients. Yet there are only a limited number of HRRP studies 
focused on MA patients. That may reflect the fact that two of the most common data 
sources for readmission analyses (Medicare claims data and the National Readmission 
Database) do not include data for MA patients.  
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One major question in particular is whether MA patients have experienced 
reductions in readmission rates since the HRRP’s implementation. While the HRRP only 
applies to admissions for TM patients, hospitals regularly admit both TM and MA 
patients. It may be that hospitals are reserving their readmission reduction resources for 
TM patients. Activities like hiring care managers for high-risk patients, conducting home 
visits, and allotting time to patient education are both time consuming and 
expensive.45,75,76 However, if hospitals do not focus these types of activities solely on 
their TM patients, MA patients are also likely to be affected by the increased attention 
on readmission reduction.  
We are aware of three studies that examined the impact of the HRRP on 
readmission rates for MA patients.19,77,78 Two of these studies, one focusing on 
California and another on Florida, found statistically significant spillover effects for MA 
patients. In the California study, both TM and MA patients experienced significant 
declines in readmission rates after implementation of the HRRP, although the effect was 
stronger for TM patients.19 In the Florida study, MA patients actually experienced a 
larger decline in readmission rates than TM patients.77 The third study used national 
data from 2011-2014 and concluded that the HRRP did not lead to significant reductions 
in readmission rates for MA patients.78  
Our approach differs from these studies in terms of our model and data. Most 
notably, we designated MA admissions for non-targeted conditions (NTCs) as our 
control group. Identifying true control groups is challenging when evaluating federal 
policies since there is the possibility that the entire population is impacted in some way. 
We decided on MA NTC admissions as our control group since these admissions are 
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neither part of a payer or condition targeted by the HRRP. We prefer this approach, 
which is also advocated by MedPAC79, as opposed to using admissions for MA patients 
in non-penalized hospitals as our control group.17,77 This is because hospitals' penalty 
status is not static and hospitals that are not penalized are still incentivized to reduce 
readmission rates to prevent future penalties.  
We analyzed inpatient hospitalization data from three large states with high rates 
of MA penetration, California, Florida, and New York, in order to assess potential 
spillover effects of the HRRP for MA patients. We compared readmission rates between 
2007-2014 for three groups: 1) TM admissions for AMI, HF, and PN;  2) MA admissions 
for AMI, HF, and PN; and 3) TM admissions for NTCs, using MA admissions for NTCs 
as our control group. We determined spillover to be present if we witnessed significant 
post-HRRP declines in MA readmission rates for AMI, HF, or PN or TM readmission 
rates for NTCs, compared with changes in readmission rates in our control group. 
 
Study Data and Methods 
 
Data 
We relied on four data sources. The first was the Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project's State Inpatient Databases (SID) for California (2007-2011), Florida (2007-
2014), and New York (2007-2014). These data are owned by the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality and include 100% of short-stay, acute-care inpatient 
hospitalizations.80 Each state decides whether to participate in the SID. The SID include 
unique patient and hospital identifiers that can be linked across time to track admissions 
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and readmissions for each patient. The SID also include patients’ diagnoses, disposition 
status, comorbidities, payer, and demographic information. 
In 2011, California stopped participating in the SID. However, the state continued 
to grant access to later years of data to researchers. The Patient Discharge Database 
can be purchased directly from California and includes all the data that California would 
have provided to the SID for 2012-2014. Much like the SID data, the Patient Discharge 
Database includes 100% of short-stay acute care inpatient hospitalizations, unique 
patient and hospital identifiers, and other key variables detailed in the paragraph 
above.81  
 Our final two datasets were the 2012-2014 Urban Influence Codes as determined 
by the Department of Agriculture and the 2012-2014 American Community Survey 
owned by the Census Bureau. We used variables from these datasets to adjust for 
patient location and median patient income for the Patient Discharge Database, as 
these are present in the SID. The Patient Discharge Database includes patient zip 
codes, allowing us to link patients to these two data sources. 
 
Sample 
 We combined admissions for California, Florida, and New York patients into a 
single cohort. We used ICD-9 codes from the primary discharge diagnosis to identify 
AMI, HF, PN and NTC admissions (N=16,421,284). For AMI, HF, and PN, we used the 
same ICD-9 codes as used by the HRRP (Appendix Table A1). For NTCs, we excluded 
all admissions with primary diagnoses of AMI, HF, and PN  as well as hip/knee 
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replacement or chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, conditions that were added to 
the HRRP during the final years of the study period.  
We then used the approach developed by Yale and CMS to create our study 
sample.82 We included index admissions for Medicare patients 65 years or older 
admitted to a short-term, acute-care inpatient hospital. If a patient had one or more 
admissions within 30 days of a previous admission we only included the first admission 
as an index admission. We identified admissions as either TM or MA based on the 
primary payer. We then excluded index admissions for patients who died before 
discharge, were discharged against medical advice, did not have at least 30 days of 
follow up data, or switched between TM and MA within 30 days of an index admission. 
For California, we also excluded index admissions occurring in the final month of 2011 
as these patients could not be tracked in the California Patient Discharge Database. 
Finally, we combined all transfers into one continuous hospitalization with the discharge 
date from the receiving hospital indicating the start of the follow up period. Our final 
cohort included 10,171,499 TM admissions and 4,324,233 MA admissions, from 
6,660,274 patients in 800 hospitals. 
   
Outcome 
 Our outcome for this study was unplanned 30-day readmissions. We employed 
CMS's planned readmission algorithm 3.0 to determine whether or not a readmission 
was planned.82 We defined readmission as a binary variable indicating the presence of 
a readmission within 30 days of an index admission. Thus, for each condition no index 
admission could have more than one readmission. Moreover, a readmission could not 
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serve as an index admission for the same condition. However, like the CMS measures, 
a readmission could be an index admission for another condition. For example, if a 
patient had an index admission for AMI and was subsequently readmitted within 30 




We first compared baseline characteristics of TM and MA admissions using 
Pearson’s chi-square tests for binary variables, Fisher's exact test for categorical 
variables, t-tests for normally distributed continuous variables, and Mann-Whitney U 
tests for non-normally distributed continuous variables.  
 Next, we constructed triple differences linear probability models to 
examine AMI, HF, and PN readmission rates for TM and MA admissions before 
and after implementation of the HRRP (2007-2011 vs. 2012-2014). As opposed 
to traditional difference-in-differences models, triple differences allows us to more 
robustly control for confounding factors while including multiple comparison 
groups, enabling the detection of spillovers.83 We compared readmission rates 
for three groups of admissions, TM admissions for AMI, HF, or PN, TM 
admissions for NTCs, and MA admissions for AMI, HF, or PN with our control 
group, MA admissions for NTCs.  
We included covariates in our models for patient age, sex, race, 
urban/rural location, median county-level income, and whether the admission 
occurred during the weekend. We also included the number of secondary patient 
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comorbidities listed during the index admission (continuous) in the vector of 
patient-level characteristics. Individuals could have a maximum of 14 secondary 
diagnoses for each index admission. We relied on the same set of diagnoses 
used by CMS’s hospital-wide readmission measure.84 We list all condition 
categories included in our risk-adjustment model in our Appendix Table A2. We 
also controlled for hospital and state-level fixed effects as well as yearly trends. 
We clustered all standard errors at the hospital level. We conducted all analyses 
in Stata version 15.1. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
We analyzed 30-day readmissions as a linear probability model. However, since 
we defined readmission as a binary outcome, we also tested the use of logit models for 
all analyses. The results of these models were nearly identical, which is not surprising 
as linear probability models closely estimate logit models when the probabilities are not 
close to 0 or 1, which is the case for the average probability of being readmitted.85 Thus, 
we preferred linear probability models for ease of interpretation.86  
We also tested the parallel trends assumption for each cohort (AMI, HF, PN, and 
NTCs). The parallel trends assumption states that trends between the intervention and 
control groups should be parallel prior to policy implementation. To test this, we limited 
our data to only the pre-period, 2007-2011. We reran all our models using 2007-2010 
data as the pre-period and 2011 data as an artificial post-period. We did not observe 
significant differences in readmission rates in 2011, supporting the parallel trends 




 There are several limitations of our study. First, it is possible that our estimates 
are biased due to omitted variables. We attempted to account for this factor by using a 
triple-differences framework. Second, triple-differences models assume no spillover to 
the control group in the post treatment period. However, it is not uncommon to rely on 
these models to examine spillover effects of policy interventions.15,17,77 We considered 
an interrupted time series model with a control group instead of triple-differences; 
however, the smallest unit of analyses was quarterly readmission rates, leaving us with 
too few data points to confidently assess pre and post-HRRP trends. Third, MA patients 
are healthier and more likely to leave MA plans for TM as their health worsens.87 We 
attempted to mitigate these differences by relying on the risk-adjustment approach 
employed by CMS’s hospital-wide readmission measure. Yet, we could not replicate 
their approach exactly as we did not have access to outpatient claims data, which CMS 
also uses for risk adjustment. If TM patients’ outpatient claims included a significantly 
different mix or number of comorbidities than their inpatient claims, our models may 
understate the reductions in risk-adjusted readmission rates for TM patients. We 
conducted sensitivity analyses using the Charlson88 and Elixhauser89 comorbidity 
indices and observed nearly identical results for all our models. Fourth, we were unable 
to control for hospital-level factors like teaching status or ownership as these data are 
not available in the SID or Patient Discharge Database. However, this would only bias 
our results if they changed over time within hospitals over the course of our study. 
Lastly, while California, Florida, and New York are large states with high MA penetration 





 Descriptive statistics (Table 4) demonstrated that compared with MA, TM 
patients were older (79 vs. 78), more likely to be female (57.3% vs. 55.4%), had more 
comorbidities (1.55 vs. 1.43), experienced longer median length of stay during 
hospitalization (4 vs. 3 days), were more likely to be white (74.3% vs. 65.2%), were less 
likely to live in large metropolitan areas (65.0% vs. 81.7%), and were more likely to be in 
the top quartile of median income (24.8% vs. 21.9%). We also compared baseline 
characteristics by condition and state in our Appendix Tables A3 and A4. 
 Unadjusted, unplanned readmission rates demonstrated similar trends for TM 
and MA admissions prior to implementation of the HRRP for both targeted and NTCs 
(Figure 2). Readmission rates were noticeably higher for TM admissions for all 
conditions during the entire study period. For AMI, unadjusted, unplanned rates showed 
a slightly downward trend prior to the HRRP, with the trend accelerating for both groups 
of admissions after 2011. The trend for HF was slightly upward prior to the HRRP, with 
a sharp decline after 2011 for both TM and MA. TM and MA readmission rates for both 
PN and NTC were steady before the HRRP and began to fall after 2011, with sharper 
declines witnessed in PN. 
The results of our DDD models revealed statistically significant reductions in 
readmission rates for both TM and MA admissions for AMI and HF, relative to declines 
in readmission rates for MA NTC admissions (Table 5). On average, readmission rates 
for both TM and MA admissions for AMI dropped by 1.0 percentage points after 
implementation of the HRRP. For HF, the decreases were 0.5 percentage points for 
both TM and MA admissions. For PN, we observed a non-significant decline of 0.3 
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percentage points for TM admissions and no decline for MA admissions. We also 
witnessed a statistically significant increase of 0.2 percentage points in post-HRRP 
readmission rates for TM NTCs. All of these differences were much smaller than the 
unadjusted post-HRRP declines observed in Figure 1. This is because there was also a 
significant decline in readmission rates of 0.5 percentage points in our control group 
after the implementation of the HRRP. We conducted post-estimation analyses, which 
demonstrated that we would need to attribute at least half of the decline in MA 
admissions for NTCs to the HRRP in order to credit the HRRP with statistically 
significant declines in all comparison groups (Table 6). We include the full results of our 




The HRRP led to statistically significant declines in readmission rates for both TM 
and MA patients admitted for AMI and HF. However, we did not observe significant 
declines in readmission rates for either MA or TM PN admissions. Moreover, we found a 
statistically significant increase in readmission rates for TM patients admitted for NTCs 
after implementation of the HRRP. We believe the reason for our PN and NTC results is 
because our control group experienced significant spillover. After implementation of the 
HRRP, readmission rates for MA NTC admissions declined by 0.5 percentage points. 
What is unclear is how much of this reduction is due to spillover from the HRRP and 
how much is due to some other underlying policy, intervention, or change. One of the 
challenges in analyzing federal policy is the ability to detect a true control group. While 
MA patients admitted for NTCs were not subject to the HRRP, nor were they admitted 
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for conditions targeted by the HRRP, we cannot rule out the possibility that this group 
also experienced spillover. If the majority of the decline in readmissions for this group 
was due to the HRRP then our models would have predicted greater spillover for our 
comparison groups. 
Our findings add to the growing body of evidence showing positive spillover 
effects of the HRRP for other conditions and payers.19,35 The spillover effects may be 
due to several factors. First, the scope of conditions and services targeted by HRRP 
has expanded substantially since it was implemented in 2012. The program initially only 
assessed readmissions for AMI, HF, and PN. The next year, CMS announced that they 
would add measures for hip/knee replacement and chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disorder. In 2014, CMS further expanded the program by revealing that they would be 
adding coronary artery bypass graft surgery in 2016. Because hospitals are more likely 
to be penalized as more measures are added,3 it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
hospital executives and clinicians to ignore the growing pressure to reduce 
readmissions, which may explain spillover effects to MA. 
Second, it might be easier for hospitals to implement a broader readmission 
reduction strategy rather than target several conditions or payers. The number and 
types of pay-for-reporting and pay-for-performance requirements have exploded over 
the last decade, with the National Quality Forum currently endorsing over 250 hospital-
based measures.90 This number balloons to well over 1,000 for all measures in federal 
and private programs.91 In recognition of the potential challenge, the Government 
Accountability Office has recommended stricter measure harmonization92 and CMS has 
convened a private-public partnership tasked with creating a core set of measures.93 
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While Congress enacted the HRRP with the initial goal of reducing readmission rates for 
penalized conditions, the increasingly complex quality measurement environment may 
have made it more difficult to solely focus on HRRP-affected patients. Thus, hospitals 
could be employing a more global approach to readmission reduction because it is less 
costly and easier to implement than targeted, policy-specific readmission reduction 
plans.  
Third, hospital executives have cited the HRRP as a key policy driving new 
initiatives to reduce readmission rates.71 This has coincided with a growing literature 
base on the types of interventions most likely to reduce readmission rates. Interventions 
like Project RED,43 the Care Transitions Intervention,40 and systematic reviews of 
readmission interventions94,95 have provided quality improvement officers and clinicians 
with more evidence-based strategies. This has led to increased emphasis by hospitals 
on introducing multi-component interventions that rely on combining strategies like 
improved discharge planning, medication reconciliation, and follow-up calls with patients 
post-discharge.96 The emergence of this evidence base, driven in large part by the 
HRRP, may have helped convince hospital leadership that reducing readmissions is 
feasible. 
Even with increased attention on reducing hospital readmissions, spillover effects 
do not appear to be universal. The size of the spillover in our study varied by condition, 
with the lowest amount witnessed in PN admissions. Although the HRRP has been 
credited with reducing readmission rates for hip/knee procedures,16 such effects have 
not been observed for procedures like aortic aneurysm repair, colectomy, cystectomy, 
or, lung resection.97,98 Thus, hospitals may need to strike a balance between hospital-
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wide interventions that benefit a wide array of patients, and condition-specific 
interventions that do not respond as well to universal readmission reduction strategies. 
 Our detection of spillover effects for MA patients might also depend on the data 
source and modeling methodology. While our main findings are consistent with other 
state-based studies19,77, they contradict one national study that found higher, not lower, 
risk-adjusted readmission rates for MA patients between 2011-2014.78 We believe this 
discrepancy is due to differences in data and methods. We used 2007-2014 data as 
opposed to 2011-2014 data. Our study relied on state-level data that included all 
Medicare inpatient hospitalizations. The national study cited above used a combination 
of MedPAR and HEDIS data which capture most, but not all, MA inpatient stays. Our 
study also differed in that we used a DDD modeling approach to compare differences 
before and after 2012 as opposed to a hierarchical model to compare differences in 
readmission rates for TM and MA patients for each individual year. Finally, our risk-
adjustment variables differed as well. Thus, our findings should be interpreted in the 
context of both our data source and modeling approach. 
Our findings have important policy implications. Although most Medicare patients 
are still enrolled in TM, the growing share of MA patients means that CMS payment 
policies focused on TM patients will have a smaller impact than the past unless spillover 
occurs. Moreover, the fragmentation of MA plans means that no single quality reform 
will be universally adapted by all plans. Instead, CMS may be best served by continuing 
to emphasize measure harmonization, especially in those areas most likely to lead to 






 The HRRP appears to be reducing readmissions for both TM and MA patients. 
However, we cannot fully discount that other MA policies or interventions could also 
have contributed to the decline in MA readmission rates. Our findings support the 
growing body of evidence on positive spillover effects of the HRRP. As federal 
policymakers continue to pursue payment reforms, they should consider focusing on 
conditions and outcomes most likely to generate spillover in order to benefit the greatest 
number of Medicare beneficiaries possible.  
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for TM and MA Admissions, 2007-2014 
 TM MA P-Val 
Index Admissions, N 10,171,499 4,324,233  
Age, Median (IQR) 79 (72-85) 78 (71-84) <0.001 
Female, N (%) 5,822,234 (57.3%) 2,396,623 (55.4%) <0.001 
Comorbidity, Mean (SD) 1.55 (1.14) 1.43 (1.10) <0.001 
Length of stay, Median (IQR) 4 (2-6) 3 (2-6) <0.001 
Race (uniform), N (%)    
White 7,474,516 (74.3%) 2,791,914 (65.2%) 
<0.001 
African-American 773,462 ( 7.7%) 512,898 (12.0%) 
Hispanic 1,090,053 (10.8%) 678,178 (15.8%) 
Asian/Pacific Islander 405,245 ( 4.0%) 152,308 ( 3.6%) 
Native American 19,362 ( 0.2%) 5,638 ( 0.1%) 
Other 296,135 ( 2.9%) 143,682 ( 3.4%) 
Patient Location, N (%)    
Large Metro (>=1,000,000) 6,591,637 (65.0%) 3,528,850 (81.7%) 
<0.001 
Small Metro (<1,000,000) 2,825,305 (27.8%) 679,929 (15.7%) 
Micropolitan 529,669 ( 5.2%) 81,673 ( 1.9%) 
Not metropolitan or micropolitan 201,935 ( 2.0%) 28,321 ( 0.7%) 
Median Income by County $, N (%)    
Quartile 1 (Poorest) 2,466,841 (24.8%) 1,081,768 (25.5%) 
<0.001 
Quartile 2 2,539,107 (25.5%) 1,102,505 (26.0%) 
Quartile 3 2,468,383 (24.8%) 1,128,602 (26.6%) 





Table 5. Changes in Readmission Rates After Implementation of the HRRP 
Relative to Changes in MA NTC Readmission Rates 
 TM 95% CI MA 95% CI 
AMI -1.0 [-1.3 , -0.6]*** -1.0 [-1.5 , -0.6]*** 
HF -0.5 [-0.8 , -0.2]*** -0.5 [-0.9 , -0.1]** 
PN -0.3 [0.0 , -0.5] 0.0 [-0.3, 0.3] 
NTC 0.2 [0.0, 0.3]* N/A N/A 
*p<0.5, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 
Table 6. Changes in Readmission Rates After Implementation of the HRRP with Different Assumptions of the 
Impact of the HRRP on MA NTC Readmission Rates 
 >50% of MA NTC Decline Due to HRRP 100% of MA NTC Decline Due to HRRP 
 TM 95% CI MA 95% CI TM 95% CI MA 95% CI 
AMI -1.3 [-1.6 , -0.9]*** -1.1 [-1.6 , -0.7]*** -1.5 [-1.9 , -1.1]*** -1.4 [-1.9 , -1.0]*** 
HF -0.8 [-1.1 , -0.5]*** -0.6 [-1.0 , -0.2]*** -1.1 [-1.3 , -0.8]*** -0.8 [-1.3 , -0.5]*** 
PN -0.5 [-0.8 , -0.3]*** -0.1 [-0.3, 0.0]* -0.8 [-1.1 , -0.5]*** -0.4 [-0.8 , 0.0]* 
NTC -0.1 [-0.3 , 0.0]* -0.2 [-0.4 , -0.1]*** -0.4 [-0.5 , -0.3]*** 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] 





CHAPTER 4. THE ASSOCIATION OF READMISSION REDUCTION ACTIVITIES 





Importance: Medicare has steadily introduced readmission measures into a 
growing number of value-based purchasing programs. The implementation of the 
Quality Payment Program means that Medicare reimbursement for many primary care 
practices (PCPs) may now be impacted by readmission rates for their patients. 
However, there remains an important gap examining how PCPs can lower readmission 
rates.  
Objective: To examine the relationship between PCPs’ number of readmission 
reduction activities and their risk-standardized readmission rates (RSRRs). 
Design, Setting, and Participants: A retrospective study of 1,788 PCPs with 
415,663 hospital admissions for 2016. We constructed mixed-effects logistic regression 
models to estimate PCP-level RSRRs. We then used a linear regression model to 
correlate PCPs RSRRs with their number of readmission reduction activities, controlling 
for PCP ownership status, number of total physicians, Census region, urban/rural 
status, and percent of patients who are dual-eligible. 
Exposures: Standardized composite score, ranging from 0-1, for PCPs’ total 
number of readmission reduction capabilities. 
Main Outcomes and Measures: The association between PCPs’ standardized 
composite score and their RSRR.
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Results: PCPs’ number of readmission reduction activities was significantly 
associated (P < .05) with lower RSRRs. On average, PCPs experienced a 0.05 
percentage point decrease in RSRR for each additional activity. RSRRs for PCPs with 
more than 20 physicians were 0.38 percentage points higher than PCPs employing 3-5 
physicians (P < .05). Each percentage point increase in PCPs’ percentage of dual-
eligible patients was associated with a 0.01 percentage point increase in RSRR (P < 
.01). Urban
PCPs had significantly lower RSRRs than large rural (-0.39 percentage points; P < .05), 
small rural (-1.71 percentage points; P < .001), and isolated PCPs (-1.35 percentage 
points; P < .01). 
Conclusions and Relevance: PCPs’ scores on the readmission reduction 
activities composite measure was significantly associated with lower RSRRs. PCPs’ 
RSRRs declined as they engaged in more of these activities. This relationship was 
stronger for PCPs with at least 200 admissions, a group that will be required to report 







The concept of reducing medically unnecessary readmissions in order to improve 
quality and reduce spending has been around for decades.1,2 However, only recently 
have policymakers introduced readmission measures into Medicare’s value-based 
purchasing programs. The first, and still most visible, of these programs was the 
Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), implemented in 2012.3 Since then, 
Medicare has also added readmission measures into a variety of other value-based 
purchasing programs directed at skilled nursing facilities4, dialysis centers6, accountable 
care organizations,8 and home health care.5 Until recently, Medicare has not assessed 
readmission rates for physician practices. The implementation of the Quality Payment 
Program (QPP) in 2017 means this is no longer the case.7 
The increased attention from Medicare and other payers to reducing 
readmissions has led to a burgeoning literature exploring the most effective strategies 
for achieving that goal. These studies can be classified into three major types. The first 
is focused on improving care transitions. Care transitions interventions often occur in 
health systems and study the impact of coordinating care across both inpatient and 
outpatient providers.39,41,99 While practices play an integral role, they are not the sole 
focus. The second examines hospitals and their ability to reduce readmission rates.42–
45,75,100,101 These studies may include aspects that involve practices but they typically 
operate on the periphery of the intervention. The third explores individual practices and 
patient-centered medical homes. The interventions are usually conducted in practices 
affiliated with academic medical centers and their findings may not be generalizable to a 
larger population of practices.52,102–104  
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Even with such a large evidence base on readmission reduction strategies, there 
remains an important gap, especially at the primary care practice (PCP) level.52 PCPs 
play an integral role in reducing readmissions105,106 but we have only limited knowledge 
of how activities conducted solely within the walls of PCPs are associated with reduced 
readmission rates for their patients. The few PCP studies we do have are often based 
on small-scale interventions conducted in one, or a handful, of organizations. While 
these are important contributions to the literature, their findings may not be externally 
valid.52,53 To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies examining the association 
of PCP activities and readmission rates in a large and diverse number of PCPs. With 
QPP payment adjustments increasing to a maximum of nine percent in 2022, there is a 
growing need to address this issue.  
We attempt to fill this gap by examining the relationship between PCP 
readmission reduction activities and readmission rates for their patients in a sample of 
over 1,700 PCPs. We combined Medicare claims data with a nationally representative 
PCP survey to create a composite readmission reduction measure based on our 
conceptual model of how PCP readmission reduction activities influence readmission 
rates. Based on our conceptual mode, we hypothesized that implementing more of 




Although we are aware of no large scale studies linking PCP interventions with 
readmission rates, we can attempt to extrapolate potentially useful strategies from the 
literature. While readmission reduction approaches vary greatly depending on the care 
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setting and study design, they share some common aspects. These include tasks like: 
communicating with patients within 72 hours of discharge,101 providing home visits after 
discharge,45 sending discharge summaries to primary care physicians,39 establishing a 
standardized process to reconcile medication,52,107 ensuring patients have access to 
their primary care provider,39 and empowering a care manager to help patients adhere 
to care plans.41,76,100 Moreover, interventions with more readmission reduction activities 
demonstrate the most significant declines in readmission rates.45,52,107–109 Thus, the total 
number of activities may be just as, if not more, vital than the type of activity when 
attempting to reduce readmission rates. 
Based on these findings, we constructed a conceptual model illustrating the 
different factors that potentially influence PCP readmission rates (Figure 1). The top half 
of the model is composed of PCP-level activities. We have categorized these into four 
distinct domains: care management, patient education, addressing social needs, and 
using data for quality improvement. Under each domain we list specific readmission 
reduction activities. These are not meant to be exhaustive but they do represent tasks 
most commonly employed in the readmission reduction literature. Each of our domains 
may independently lead to reduced readmissions but the literature suggests they are 
most successful when combined. On the bottom half of the conceptual model we list 
patient and organizational-level factors that influence readmission rates but are outside 
of a PCP’s control. We believe these factors should be adjusted for as much as possible 





Study Data and Methods 
 
Data  
We relied on the National Survey of Healthcare Organizations and Systems 
(NSHOS) to obtain PCP-level activities potentially associated with readmission. The 
NSHOS is a nationally representative survey, conducted from 2017-2018, of primary 
care and multi-specialty physician practices.110 The NSHOS employed a stratified-
cluster sampling design to survey health systems, hospitals, and physician practices 
with three or more primary care physicians on a wide range of organizational 
characteristics and capabilities. The sample frame was derived from IQVIA’s OneKey 
database, which includes information on more than 9.6 million healthcare workers at 
over 700,000 healthcare organizations.111 The NSHOS oversampled practices from 
several categories to ensure reliable estimates for myriad practice types, including 
practices participating in accountable care organizations, the High Value Healthcare 
Collaborative, and the National Survey of Physician Organizations. We evaluated 2016 




The NSHOS initially identified 4,976 practices that met inclusion criteria. Of 
these, 2,333 (47%) completed the survey; 143 of the responding practices were 
excluded because it could not be confirmed that they were in the survey sample frame. 
After merging 2017-2018 NSHOS data with 2015-2016 Medicare data using patients’ 
beneficiary ID number and PCPs’ tax identification number, another 117 PCPs were 
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excluded because no patients were assigned to them. Finally, in order to create reliable 
estimates, we restricted our sample to PCPs with at least 25 index admissions. The final 
sample included 1,788 practices and 415,663 admissions from all 50 states and 
Washington DC. Patients were included in our sample if they were 65 and older, 
continuously enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B 12 months prior to and including the 
date of the index readmission, and enrolled in Part A for at least 30 days after the date 
of discharge. We include comparisons of PCP and patient-level characteristics for 
survey respondents and non-respondents in our Appendix Tables A1 and A2.  
 
Patient Attribution 
 We attributed patients to practices by mirroring the approach used in the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program.112 We assigned patients to practices based on 
where they received the plurality of their evaluation and management visits. If a patient 
did not have any primary care visits during the year, we attributed them to the specialist 
practice where they received the plurality of their evaluation and management visits. 
 
Outcome 
 We modeled our outcome using CMS’s hospital-wide readmission measure 
methodology.84 A readmission was defined as any unplanned admission occurring 
within 30 days of a previous index admission. We excluded index admissions for 
patients who died during hospitalization, were discharged against medical advice, were 
admitted for psychiatric, cancer, or rehabilitation treatment, or were no longer enrolled in 
Medicare Part A at least 30 days after discharge. We combined stays into a single 
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continuous hospitalization if a patient was discharged from one hospital and admitted 
the same or next day to another hospital. Unlike CMS’s condition-specific readmission 
measures, a readmission can serve as both a readmission and an index admission in 
the hospital-wide readmission measure. For example, if a patient were admitted on 
January 1 and readmitted on January 20, the January 20 admission would count as a 
readmission for the January 1 hospitalization and an index admission for future 
hospitalizations. We distinguished between planned and unplanned readmissions by 
applying CMS’s planned readmission algorithm 4.0.84 
 
Independent Variable 
 Our independent variable of interest was practices’ total number of readmission 
reduction activities. We created this composite measure by first identifying 30 candidate 
variables from the survey, representing all four domains of our conceptual model (full list 
in Appendix Table A3). We dichotomized Likert scale questions by recoding “never”, 
“sometimes”, and “often” as zero and “always” as one; this was consistent with our 
conceptual model that is based on practices performing readmission reduction activities 
for all, not most, patients. We then reviewed the interitem correlations of each candidate 
variable, assuming tetrachoric correlations, to arrive at a list of mutually exclusive 
variables. We narrowed our final list to 12 variables (Table 1). Nearly all variables had 
interitem correlations under 0.3 and only one was above 0.5 (0.53), indicating the 
measures were capturing separate care components. 
Next, we created a standardized score for our composite measure ranging from 
0-1. The numerator was the total number of survey questions for which a practice 
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responded yes or always; the denominator was the total number of survey questions 
without missing data for that practice. We used this method for the denominator so that 
practices that did not respond to all 12 survey questions were not penalized for missing 
data. We excluded any practices that responded to fewer than seven questions. More 
than 93% of practices responded to 11 or 12 of the questions and only 14 were 
excluded for responding to fewer than seven.  
 
Statistical Analyses 
 We compared patient and PCP characteristics by quartiles of PCP-level 
observed (unadjusted) readmission rate. We compared means for normally distributed 
continuous variables using t-tests. When continuous variables were not normally 
distributed, we employed Mann-Whitney U tests. We used chi-square tests to compare 
groups on binary and categorical variables.  
We calculated PCPs’ risk-standardized readmission rates (RSRR) for hospital-
wide readmissions using a mixed effects logistic regression model, modeling patient 
readmissions as a dichotomous outcome. We adjusted this model for patient race, 
median income of a patient’s census tract, frailty, and hierarchical condition category 
(HCC) score. We then replicated CMS’s method for calculating PCPs’ predicted over 
expected readmission rates.84 The predicted readmission rate is based on each PCP’s 
patient characteristics and their PCP intercept. The expected readmission rate is based 
on each PCP’s patient characteristics and the overall mean PCP intercept. This results 
in a standardized readmission ratio which we then multiplied by the observed 
readmission rate for all patients to arrive at PCPs’ RSRRs.  
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 After calculating PCPs’ RSRRs, we estimated a PCP-level linear regression 
model with RSRRs as the outcome. Our independent variable of interest was a 
continuous variable representing PCPs’ readmission composite measure score, which 
ranged from 0-1. We included control variables for PCP ownership status, number of 
total physicians, Census region, urban/rural status, and percent of patients who are 
dual-eligible. We applied survey weights for all analyses. We conducted all analyses in 
Stata 16.0. This study was deemed exempt by our institution’s internal review board. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
We constructed our independent variable based on our conceptual model. We 
then estimated our PCP-level linear regression model using this definition. However, in 
post-hoc analyses we also examined several other specifications of our independent 
variable. We estimated our PCP-level linear regression model with covariates for each 
individual survey question, as opposed to a composite score. We also conducted 
principal component analysis using all 30 original candidate measures as well as the 12 
measures included in our final composite. We also revised our composite measure to 
only include activities that were negatively associated with RSRRs, using a data-driven 
approach as opposed to solely relying on our theory. Finally, we restricted all our 









PCP and Admission Characteristics  
 When comparing PCPs by quartile of observed readmission rates, we noticed 
several key differences (Table 2). Observed readmission rates increased as PCPs 
cared for greater numbers of admitted patients. PCPs in the lowest quartile of observed 
readmission rates were more likely to be independently owned, employ 3-5 physicians, 
be located in urban areas, or operate in the West. We also observed increases in PCPs’ 
percentage of dual-eligible patients when moving from lower to higher quartiles. 
Admissions attributed to PCPs in each quartile were fairly similar in age, sex, and race 
across all four quartiles. We observed monotonically increasing values for disability, 
frailty, and HCC score when moving from the first to fourth quartile. The inverse was 
true for median income. 
 
Practice-Level Model 
 Our main independent variable of interest, the readmission activities composite, 
was significantly associated (P < 0.05) with lower RSRRs. We observed a 0.05 
percentage point decrease in RSRRs for each additional activity in our composite 
measure that a PCP engaged in, holding all other factors constant (Table 9). Engaging 
in more readmission reduction activities was associated with lower RSRRs (Figure 6). 
On average, RSRRs for practices with composite scores between 0.8-1.0 were one 
percentage point lower than practices that engaged in none of the activities in our 
composite measure.  
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RSRRs for PCPs with more than 20 physicians were 0.37 percentage points 
higher than PCPs employing 3-5 physicians (P < .05). Compared with PCPs in the East, 
RSRRs for PCPs in the West were 0.40 percentage points lower (P < .01). Urban PCPs 
had significantly lower RSRRs than large rural (-0.40 percentage points; P < .05), small 
rural (-1.73 percentage points; P < .001), and isolated PCPs (-1.38; P < .001). Each 
percentage point increase in PCPs’ percentage of dual-eligible patients was associated 
with a 0.01 percentage point increase in RSRR (P < .01). We did not observe a 
significant relationship between practice ownership category and RSRR. We include the 
results of our mixed-effects model in Appendix Table A4 and Figure A1. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
When we estimated our linear regression model with covariates for each 
individual survey question, as opposed to a composite score, we found that nine of 
them were negatively associated with readmissions but none of the 12 individual survey 
questions was statistically significant (p<0.05). This suggests that reductions in 
readmission rates were not driven by one or two activities. Principal component analysis 
using all 30 candidate measures resulted in seven factors with eigenvalues above 1.0. 
None of these factors was significantly associated (p<0.05) with lower RSRRs when we 
jointly controlled for all seven. Principal component analysis of the 12 measures 
included in our final composite measure resulted in three factors with eigenvalues 
above 1.0 and again, none of the factors was significant (p<0.05). We then modeled 
RSRRs as a function of a revised composite score with only the nine tasks negatively 
associated with RSRRs. As expected, the effect of the composite score increased, from 
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-0.05 to -0.08. Finally, the effect size of the composite score measure nearly doubled, 
and remained statistically significant, when we limited our sample to practices with at 




We found that PCPs with more readmission reduction activities experienced 
lower RSRRs. This relationship was statistically significant and supports our hypothesis. 
Prior studies have also demonstrated this effect at the hospital-level,45 across the 
continuum of care (hospitals, practices, and community services),108 or for individual 
practices and health systems.52,107  However, our finding is novel because it includes 
over 1,700 PCPs and only incorporates capabilities directly under the control of PCPs. 
This association was nearly twice as strong when we further limited our analysis to only 
practices with at least 200 admissions, consistent with the QPP minimum case size 
requirement.  
Our findings have several important implications. First, while each of the activities 
in our composite measure was a component of commonly successful readmission 
reduction interventions, none was significantly correlated with lower RSRRs by itself. 
Instead, increasing reductions in readmission rates occurred as PCPs performed more 
activities. Average RSRRs for PCPs performing almost all or all of the activities in our 
composite measure were a full percentage point lower than RSRRs for PCPs engaging 
in none of the activities. A one percentage point change in RSRR was the difference 
between being classified in the 50th or 75th percentile of RSRR. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that successfully reducing readmissions may depend on a 
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multitude of activities. This may explain why multi-component interventions have proven 
to be the most effective at reducing readmissions.94 However, we acknowledge the 
possibility that PCPs implementing more activities do so because of a strong 
readmission reduction culture or greater financial/human resources. These latent 
variables may be just as, or more, vital than the number of activities. 
Second, we found that PCPs employing over 20 physicians were significantly 
more likely to have higher RSRRs, even after controlling for their readmission reduction 
activities composite score. This is consistent with previous studies demonstrating that 
practices employing fewer physicians performed better on readmissions than practices 
with larger numbers of physicians.113,114 It may be that smaller practices are more 
nimble than larger practices and can more easily adjust their activities based on their 
patients’ needs. It is also possible that ensuring all physicians regularly engage in these 
activities is easier when there are fewer clinicians. While many smaller practices 
performed better in our study, most will be exempt from the requirement to report on 
readmissions as part of MIPS.7 Moreover, the overall percentage of small (2-5 
physicians) or solo practices has been rapidly decreasing, from 51.5% in 2012 to 41.2% 
in 2018.115 During this same period, the percentage of practices with at least 30 
physicians increased from 19.9% to 27.5%. This trend may be accelerated by the 
COVID-19 pandemic which is putting increased financial strain on practices, many of 
which are experiencing decreases in revenue of over 50%.116 Thus, the number of 
practices that are well suited because of their smaller size to reduce readmissions could 
continue to shrink, possibly at an even faster rate than before COVID-19.  
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Third, our findings highlight the possibility that the current risk-adjustment 
methodology used by CMS may not properly capture all patient-risk factors. We 
observed significantly higher RSRRs for both rural PCPs and PCPs caring for more 
dual-eligible patients. It is possible that these providers truly do perform worse on 
readmissions. However, it is also conceivable that patient factors like distance from their 
PCP117 and lower education or income30 make it more difficult to prevent these patients 
from being readmitted. CMS initially opposed adjusting quality measures for these types 
of socioeconomic variables on the basis that it would hold providers to different 
standards of care based on their patients’ demographics.73 However, CMS has since 
revised that stance. The HRRP now splits hospitals into peer groups based on their 
percentage of dual-eligible patients. And the MIPS includes a complex patient bonus of 
up to five points based, in part, on the percentage of a clinician’s patients who are dual 
eligible.118 Moreover, the MIPS excludes many rural providers since the program does 
not apply to rural health clinics or federally qualified health centers. While this approach 
is welcome, not all rural practices will be excluded and the MIPS complex patient bonus 
may not fully account for the effect of caring for dual-eligible patients.38,119 Moving 
forward, it will be important for CMS and others to monitor their approach to ensure that 
rural clinicians and practices in addition to those caring for high percentages of dual-
eligible patients are not disproportionately penalized as part of the MIPS. 
Finally, although routinely engaging in multiple readmission reduction activities 
can help reduce readmission rates, it may not be at the top of many PCPs’ agenda. 
Over two-thirds of physicians are exempt from the MIPS, and only practices with at least 
200 inpatient admissions and 16 or more clinicians are required to report on 
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readmissions.7 Moreover, performance on readmissions represents a tiny proportion of 
the overall MIPS score and, depending on the APM, readmission performance may be 
even less important. Even though CMS increasingly incentivizes physicians and their 
practices to reduce readmissions, there still may not be a business case for PCPs to 
invest significant resources into activities like hiring care managers or conducting home 
visits. This is especially true if these investments do not also improve performance on 
the ever growing number of other quality measurement requirements.  
We acknowledge several limitations when interpreting our findings. First, fewer 
than half of PCPs responded to the NSHOS. While PCPs responding to the survey were 
similar to non-respondents on several key observable characteristics, our sample may 
not be representative of the general population. Second, as with any survey there is 
always the possibility of measurement error, which could bias our estimates. In general, 
this would cause attenuation bias, thus the fact that our composite measure was 
significant, even in the presence of measurement error, is reassuring. Third, our survey 
is based on 2017-2018 data but we assessed readmissions for patients admitted in 
2016. If PCPs’ readmission reduction activities significantly changed from 2016 to 2017-
2018, our findings may not accurately assess the relationship between readmission 
reduction activities and readmission rates. Fourth, the NSHOS survey does not include 
PCPs with fewer than three physicians, which limits generalizability. Fifth, since our 
study was cross-sectional there is the possibility for omitted variable bias and our 
findings do not allow us to infer causality. Finally, our study was conducted prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic which could create a healthcare landscape dramatically different 





 Routinely engaging in a greater number of readmission reduction activities was 
significantly associated with lower PCP-level RSRRs. This size of this association 
almost doubled when we limited our sample to practices with at least 200 admissions. 
We also observed that practices employing more than 20 physicians, rural practices, 
and practices caring for larger proportions of dual-eligible patients had higher average 
RSRRs. CMS and other payers should ensure they are properly accounting for factors 






Table 7. Questions Included in Composite Measure of Readmission Reduction 
Capabilities 
Care Management 
Is a care manager involved in helping high-risk patients adhere to their care plan? 
Does your practice routinely conduct home visits after high-risk patients are 
discharged from the hospital? 
Does your practice routinely receive discharge summaries within 72 hours of 
hospitalization for high-risk patients? 
Does your practice have a standardized process to reconcile medications for high-risk 
patients discharged from the hospital? 
Patient Education 
Does your practice have a system in place to routinely screen patients for health 
literacy? 
Do clinicians routinely engage in shared-decision making with patients? 
Does your practice collect patient-reported measures of patient activation? 
Addressing Social Needs 
Does your practice routinely refer high-risk hospitalized patients to community health-
related social services? 
Does your practice currently use any culturally tailored programs or interventions? 
Using Data for Quality Improvement 
Does your practice use data on hospital admissions or readmissions for internal 
use/quality improvement efforts? 
Does your practice use data to modify the discharge planning process as needed? 
Does your practice base clinician performance, in part, on patient readmissions or use 





Table 8. Patient and Hospital Characteristics by Observed Practice Readmission 
Rate Quartile 
Practice 
Characteristic Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
P 
Value 












Rate, %(SE) 7.87 (2.12) 11.89 (8.53) 15.01 (9.60) 20.49 (3.80) <0.001 
Ownership, N(%)      
Independent 155 (34.75) 121 (27.19) 128 (28.51) 117 (26.59) 
0.006 
A larger 
physician group 44 ( 9.87) 56 (12.58) 47 (10.47) 50 (11.36) 
A hospital 58 (13.00) 61 (13.71) 76 (16.93) 79 (17.95) 
A healthcare 
system 175 (39.24) 185 (41.57) 180 (40.09) 158 (35.91) 
Other 14 ( 3.14) 22 ( 4.94) 18 ( 4.01) 36 ( 8.18) 
Number of 
Physicians, N(%) 
     
3-5 187 (41.83) 147 (32.89) 143 (31.64) 147 (33.26) 
0.001 6-20 205 (45.86) 224 (50.11) 215 (47.57) 202 (45.70) 
21+ 55 (12.30) 76 (17.00) 94 (20.80) 93 (21.04) 
Census Region      
Northeast 84 (18.79) 84 (18.79) 90 (19.91) 109 (24.66) 
<0.001 
Midwest 131 (29.31) 137 (30.65) 130 (28.76) 145 (32.81) 
South 109 (24.38) 127 (28.41) 155 (34.29) 117 (26.47) 




     
Urban 409 (91.50) 385 (86.13) 362 (80.09) 331 (74.89) 
<0.001 
Large Rural 22 ( 4.92) 39 ( 8.72) 62 (13.72) 41 ( 9.28) 
Small Rural 12 ( 2.68) 18 ( 4.03) 18 ( 3.98) 56 (12.67) 












Characteristic      
N 53,352 96,627 134,151 131,533  












Race, N(%)      







<0.001 Black 2,776 (5.25) 4,692 (4.90) 9,377 (7.03) 
11,555 
(8.83) 
Other 2,060 (3.90) 3,049 (3.18) 4,440 (3.33) 4,178 (3.19) 











mean(SE) 2.34 (1.60) 2.53 (1.71) 2.81 (1.85) 3.22 (2.03) <0.001 




















Table 9. Linear Regression Results of Practice-Level 2016 Readmission Rates 
 Coefficient SE P Val 
Readmission Composite -0.520 0.260 0.046 
Ownership (ref. group Health 
System)    
Independent -0.051 0.123 0.679 
Physician Group -0.023 0.163 0.819 
Hospital 0.230 0.160 0.152 
Number of Physicians (ref. group 3-
5)    
6-20 0.058 0.115 0.617 
20+ 0.365 0.158 0.021 
Ownership (ref. group Northeast)    
Midwest -0.082 0.140 0.555 
South -0.092 0.134 0.494 
West -0.404 0.140 0.004 
RUCA (ref. group Urban)    
Large Rural 0.401 0.194 0.038 
Small Rural 1.725 0.350 <0.001 
Isolated 1.382 0.564 0.014 
% Patients Dual-Eligible 0.010 0.327 0.003 
 
 





















Readmission Reduction Activities Composite Score
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
Summary of Findings  
  
This dissertation investigated the topic of hospital readmissions from several 
perspectives. It analyzed the role of financial incentives in motivating recent declines in 
Medicare readmission rates. It explored the possibility of spillover effects for patients 
who are not subject to Medicare’s readmission policies. Finally, it explored whether 
activities conducted in primary care practices could help reduce their patients’ 
readmission rates. Below I summarize the main findings of each of the three aims. I 
then highlight several policy implications of my findings and suggest topics for future 
research.  
In the first aim, I demonstrated that the size of HRRP’s payment adjustments do 
not appear to be associated with declining Medicare readmission rates. Facing the 
potential of larger HRRP payment adjustments was not associated with lower ERRs. 
While the financial incentives associated with the HRRP may have acted as a triggering 
mechanism to signal hospitals on the need to reduce readmissions, I did not observe a 
direct relationship between the size of the incentive and performance on readmissions. 
This finding challenges the notion that in order for P4P programs to be successful they 
must use large payment adjustments.120,121 It is also possible that the HRRP’s payment 
penalties are too small to incentivize differential performance based on penalty size and 




In the second aim, I found that the HRRP has led to significant declines in 
readmission rates for patients admitted for conditions both targeted and not targeted by 
the HRRP. Readmission rates for both TM and MA patients were significantly lower 
after implementation of the HRRP, indicating the presence of policy spillover. I found the 
greatest evidence of spillover for patients admitted for either AMI or HF, with less 
evidence of spillover for PN patients or TM patients admitted for NTCs. The results of 
this study add to the growing literature showing HRRP spillover for non-TM patients. 
They also raise the possibility that many hospitals do not have the capacity or resources 
to selectively target their readmission reduction activities to only TM patients and 
instead focus their efforts on a strategy aimed at reducing readmissions for all patients.  
In the third aim, I found that PCPs that regularly engage in numerous 
readmission reduction activities are more likely to reduce their patients’ readmission 
rates than practices that participate in fewer activities. I also found that certain PCP 
characteristics like employing fewer physicians, caring for fewer dual-eligible patients, 
and operating in an urban setting are associated with lower readmission rates. There is 
strong face validity that PCPs play a central role in reducing readmissions and my 




While all three dissertation aims focused on the topic of readmissions, each of 
them has distinct policy implications. First, the fact that facing larger potential HRRP 
payment adjustments was not associated with lower readmission raises the question of 
how Medicare should view the role of financial incentives in its value-based purchasing 
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programs. Given that readmission rates initially declined after HRRP’s implementation, 
federal policymakers may not be concerned with whether this was due to the HRRP’s 
payment adjustments or some other factor related to the program. Nevertheless, with 
readmission declines slowing down in more recent years, it is important for 
policymakers to understand the reasons for the HRRP’s initial success in order to 
determine if modifications to the program need to be made to reaccelerate declines in 
readmissions.  
Second, the presence of spillover in the HRRP suggests policymakers should 
explore if any lessons can be applied to other care settings or quality areas. This has 
important policy implications since Medicare continues to embrace value-based 
purchasing.57 If existing or future Medicare programs are able to generate similar 
amounts of spillover, then there is the potential for Medicare to more strongly influence 
quality and resource use throughout the health care system. It is possible that reducing 
readmissions is an activity that is more likely than others to produce spillover, making it 
harder to replicate this success in other measures or programs. Conversely, the HRRP 
may have led to spillover because it is a simple program to understand and relies on 
interventions that are less likely to only be applied to TM patients.122,123 If it is more of 
the latter, Medicare could benefit from designing other value-based purchasing 
programs after the HRRP. Programs that demonstrate spillover for MA patients should 
be closely scrutinized as Medicare patients are increasingly deciding to enroll in MA 
instead of TM. 
 Third, primary care is an important care setting to target if policymakers wish to 
further reduce readmission rates for Medicare patients. I found that engaging in more 
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readmission reduction activities may help PCPs lower their readmission rates. However, 
many of these activities are costly in terms of time and money and there may not be a 
business case for PCPs to invest the resources needed to successfully implement these 
activities. Insomuch as policymakers view reducing readmissions as central to 
Medicare’s mission, it may make sense to investigate options for incentivizing PCPs to 
adopt more readmission reduction activities. However, it appears that Medicare 
administrators believe that, similar to the HRRP, financial incentives will motivate 
practices to lower readmission rates. Medicare includes a readmission measure in the 
QPP. But the QPP is vastly more complex than the HRRP and the readmission 
measure in the QPP only applies to a small percentage of practices. It is possible, that 
like the HRRP, the inclusion of a readmission measure in the QPP will send a signal to 
all PCPs that reducing readmissions is important. If this is not the case, then reducing 
PCP readmission rates may be more feasible if Medicare follows the recommendations 




While the results of this dissertation fill important gaps in the readmissions 
literature, future research is needed to expand on these findings. First, though this 
dissertation demonstrated that incentive size may not dictate performance on hospital 
readmissions, I only examined a single program. Policymakers are constantly 
expanding Medicare value-based purchasing programs and we still know relatively little 
about how performance on these programs relates to payment adjustments. We need 
more studies examining the relationship between performance and incentive size over 
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longer periods of time. We also need qualitative studies examining provider perception 
of these financial incentives. We know very little about how hospitals, clinicians, and 
other health care workers view these incentives, which may help to explain why some 
value-based purchasing programs lead to improvement while others do not. 
Second, while this dissertation demonstrated spillover effects of the HRRP for 
MA patients it only investigated readmissions for patients in three states, California, 
Florida, and New York. These are three of the most populous states but they still 
represent a minority of MA patients. These findings would be even more convincing if 
they were replicated in a national sample of MA patients, relying on the same methods I 
used in Chapter 3. Moreover, we need more studies examining spillover of Medicare 
value-based purchasing programs in general. Programs like the Hospital-Value Based 
Purchasing Program, Hospital-Acquired Condition Program, Quality Payment Program, 
and Skilled Nursing Value-Based Program all apply to only TM patients but may also 
impact the quality of care for MA patients. The need for this research is vital as MA 
enrollment continues to increase even as Medicare value-based purchasing programs 
remain almost entirely focused on TM patients. 
Third, the research on primary care activities associated with lower readmission 
rates is an important contribution to the literature. Yet, because it is the first of its kind 
we need future research to corroborate these findings. It would be beneficial to see 
similar studies replicated with either more years of data or in more practices in order to 
confirm the findings. It is also important to conduct research investigating cultural and 
financial characteristics of practices and their relationship between both readmission 
reduction activities and readmission rates. Another avenue is to test whether or not the 
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quality of the activities, as opposed to the number, also predicts readmission rates. It 
would also be intriguing research to examine how much hospitals influence 
readmissions versus practices. For example, does a practice with low readmission rates 
perform well because of what they do to reduce readmissions, or because most of their 
patients are admitted to a hospital that performs well on readmissions. 
In conclusion, Medicare readmission policies have impacted multiple levels of the 
US health care system, from patients to practices to hospitals. There is reason to 
believe Medicare will play an even bigger role in reducing readmissions in the future 
with the inclusion of readmission measures in many of Medicare’s newer value-based 
purchasing programs. This dissertation suggests that the success of these initiatives 
could depend on aspects like the incentive structure of the programs, the ability to 
generate spillover, and the likelihood of providers incorporating large numbers of 







Appendix Table A1. ICD-9 Codes used to Define Cohorts 
AMI HF PN NTC 
410.00 402.01 480.0 81.51 
410.01 402.11 480.1 81.54 
410.10 402.91 480.2 491.21 
410.11 404.01 480.3 491.22 
410.20 404.03 480.9 491.9 
410.21 404.11 481 492.8 
410.30 404.13 482.0 493.20 
410.31 404.91 482.1 493.21 
410.40 404.93 482.2 493.22 
410.41 428.0 482.30 496 
410.50 428.1 482.31 51881* 
410.51 428.20 482.32 51882* 
410.60 428.21 482.39 51884* 
410.61 428.22 482.40 7991* 
410.70 428.23 482.41  
410.71 428.30 482.42  
410.80 428.31 482.49  
410.81 428.32 482.81  
410.90 428.33 482.82  
410.91 428.40 482.83  
 428.41 482.84  
 428.42 482.89  
 428.43 482.9  
 428.9 483.0  
  483.1  
  483.8  
  485  
  486  
  487.0  
  488.11  
  507.0  





Appendix Table A2. Risk Adjustment Variables for Comorbidities Present on 
Index Admission 
CC Name CC Number 
Severe Infection 1, 3-6 
Metastatic cancer and acute leukemia 8 
Severe cancer 9, 10 
Other cancers 11-14 
Diabetes mellitus (DM) or DM complications 
18, 19, 122, 
123 
Protein-calorie malnutrition 21 
Other significant endocrine and metabolic disorders 23 
End-stage liver disease; cirrhosis of liver 27, 28 
Chronic pancreatitis 34 
Rheumatoid arthritis and inflammatory connective tissue 
disease 40 
Severe hematological disorders 46 
Iron deficiency or other/unspecified anemias and blood 
disease 49 
Drug/alcohol psychosis or dependence 54, 55 
Psychiatric comorbidity 57-59, 61, 63 
Hemiplegia, paraplegia, paralysis, functional disability 70-74 
Seizure disorders and convulsions 79 
Coronary atherosclerosis or angina, cerebrovascular disease 89, 102, 105 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 111 
Fibrosis of lung or other chronic lung disorders 112 
Viral and unspecified pneumonia, pleurisy 116 
Kidney transplant status 132 






Appendix Table A3. Descriptive Statistics for TM and MA Admissions by Condition, 2007-2014 
 AMI HF PN NTC 
 TM MA TM MA TM MA TM MA 
Index Admissions, 































86) 79 (72-85) 77 (71-84) 






























(1.09) 1.52 (1.14) 1.40 (1.10) 
Length of stay, 
Median (IQR) 4 (3-8) 4 (2-7) 4 (3-7) 4 (2-6) 5 (3-7) 4 (2-6) 4 (2-6) 3 (2-6) 
Race (uniform), N 
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Appendix Table A4. Descriptive Statistics for TM and MA Admissions by State, 2007-2014 
 CA FL NY 
 TM MA TM MA TM MA 
Observations, N 4,090,666 1,994,928 4,069,295 1,544,690 3,403,050 1,318,655 
Unique Patients, N 1,883,507 1,027,078 1,431,538 597,956 1,217,545 502,669 
Age, Median (IQR) 79 (72-85) 78 (72-85) 79 (72-85) 77 (71-83) 80 (73-86) 77 (71-84) 













# Comorbidities, Mean 
(SD) 1.59 (1.16) 1.42 (1.09) 1.58 (1.15) 1.46 (1.12) 1.45 (1.12) 1.40 (1.10) 
Length of stay, Median 
(IQR) 4 (2-6) 3 (2-5) 4 (2-6) 3 (2-6) 4 (2-7) 4 (2-7) 


































































































































Median Income by 
County, N (%)       

























































Appendix Table A5. Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Results by Condition, 2007-2014*    
 AMI HF PN 
 Coef SE P Val Coef SE P Val Coef SE P Val 
Target 0.0416 0.0018 0.000 0.0728 0.0014 <0.001 0.0236 0.0013 <0.001 
Post -0.0053 0.0007 0.000 -0.0055 0.0007 <0.001 -0.0055 0.0007 <0.001 
Target*Post -0.0104 0.0022 0.000 -0.0049 0.0019 0.010 0.0000 0.0018 0.986 
TM 0.0159 0.0007 0.000 0.0160 0.0007 <0.001 0.0159 0.0007 <0.001 
Target*TM 0.0022 0.0020 0.268 0.0063 0.0015 <0.001 0.0038 0.0014 0.009 
TM*Post 0.0016 0.0006 0.013 0.0017 0.0007 0.010 0.0016 0.0007 0.012 
Target*Post*TM -0.0009 0.0027 0.742 -0.0019 0.0022 0.388 -0.0041 0.0022 0.058 
Age 0.0012 0.0000 0.000 0.0010 0.0000 <0.001 0.0011 0.0000 <0.001 
Weekend Admit 0.0038 0.0003 0.000 0.0043 0.0003 <0.001 0.0038 0.0003 <0.001 
# Comorbidities 0.0226 0.0003 0.000 0.0220 0.0003 <0.001 0.0223 0.0003 <0.001 
Female -0.0138 0.0003 0.000 -0.0138 0.0003 <0.001 -0.0145 0.0003 <0.001 
Location (Large Metro ref 
group)          
Small Metro  -0.0102 0.0015 0.000 -0.0101 0.0015 <0.001 -0.0100 0.0015 <0.001 
Micro -0.0119 0.0019 0.000 -0.0117 0.0020 <0.001 -0.0113 0.0019 <0.001 
Not Metro/Micro -0.0175 0.0019 0.000 -0.0175 0.0020 <0.001 -0.0167 0.0020 <0.001 
Race (White ref group)          
Black 0.0189 0.0008 0.000 0.0187 0.0008 <0.001 0.0190 0.0008 <0.001 
Hispanic 0.0038 0.0007 0.000 0.0045 0.0007 <0.001 0.0031 0.0007 <0.001 
Asian/Pac Islander -0.0028 0.0011 0.009 -0.0025 0.0011 0.020 -0.0039 0.0011 <0.001 
Native American 0.0115 0.0041 0.005 0.0100 0.0041 0.014 0.0091 0.0041 0.026 
Other -0.0090 0.0015 0.000 -0.0085 0.0015 <0.001 -0.0091 0.0015 <0.001 
Median Income (Q1 
lowest, ref group)          
Q2 -0.0038 0.0006 0.000 -0.0040 0.0006 <0.001 -0.0038 0.0006 <0.001 




Q4 -0.0108 0.0007 0.000 -0.0107 0.0007 <0.001 -0.0107 0.0007 <0.001 
Year -0.0006 0.0001 0.000 -0.0006 0.0001 <0.001 -0.0006 0.0001 <0.001 
State (California ref 
group)          
Florida 0.0146 0.0016 0.000 0.0138 0.0016 0.000 0.0190 0.0015 <0.001 
New York 0.0250 0.0004 0.000 0.0264 0.0004 0.000 0.0251 0.0004 <0.001 

















Size    
% Small: 2-9 Physicians (n) 75.1% (1,757) 75.6% (2,044) 77.9% (12,279) 
% Medium: 10-20 
Physicians (n) 15.5% (363) 15.5% (418) 14.2% (2,232) 
% Large: 21+ Physicians 
(n) 9.4% (221) 9.0% (242) 8.0% (1,257) 
Mean # of Physicians† (SD) 11.8 (63.3) 10.1 (21.1) 9.6 (29.9) 
Mean # of Primary Care 
Physicians (SD) 6.7 (12.3) 6.4 (7.6) 6.1 (8.0) 
Mean # of Specialists (SD)  5.1 (51.8) 3.8 (15.0) 3.6 (23.4) 
Mean # of Associate 
Providers‡ (SD) 2.2 (4.7) 2.2 (4.2) 2.1 (4.1) 
Geography    
% Urban (n) 77.1% (1,804) 79.0% (2,136) 77.5% (12,215) 
% Suburban (n) 15.9% (371) 15.4% (416) 15.5% (2,448) 
% Rural (n)  7.1% (166) 5.6% (152) 7.0% (1,105) 
% Midwest (n) 29.1% (682) 25.5% (690) 26.0% (4,096) 
% Northeast (n) 20.0% (467) 20.9% (566) 20.5% (3,226) 
% South (n) 26.5% (620) 30.0% (805) 32.0% (5,050) 
% West (n) 24.4% (572) 23.8% (643) 21.5% (3,396) 
System Characteristic    
% Independent (n)  32.5% (761) 35.1% (949) 48.4% (7,638) 
% Medical Group Only 
System (n) 16.4% (383) 16.2% (438) 14.0% (2,206) 
% Simple System (n) 15.7% (368) 14.0% (378) 11.8% (1,867) 
% Complex System (n) 35.4% (829) 34.7% (939) 25.7% (4,057) 
Mean # of Owner 
Subsidiaries (SD)  3.1 (5.9) 3.5 (6.4) 3.3 (6.4) 
Mean # of Acute Care 
Hospitals (SD)  15.9 (33.3) 17.1 (35.5) 17.1 (37.7) 
Mean # of Medical Groups 
(SD) 105.7 (147.0) 113.4 (157.9) 115.5 (160.8) 
Mean # of states operating 
in (SD) 3.5 (5.7) 3.7 (5.8) 3.8 (6.4) 
% Part of Medicare ACO (n) 30.8% (487) 32.3% (567) 28.9% (2,355) 
*Includes surveyed and non-surveyed organizations  
†Physicians = All MD/DO; Sum of Primary Care and Specialist Physicians 




Appendix Table A7. Patient-Level Characteristics for Patients Attributed to 




Index Admission 415,663 6,035,536 
Mean Age 77.8 77.9 
Female (%) 56 56 
Race (%)   
White 90 86 
Black or Hispanic 7 10 
Asian 3 4 
Mean CMS-HCC score 2.8 3 
Mean Length of Stay 4.7 5.0 
Discharge Disposition (%)   
Home 48 44 
Skilled Nursing Facility 25 22 
Home Health 20 21 
Original Reason for Entitlement Code 
(%)   
Old Age 85 84 
Disability/ESRD 15 16 
Dual-Eligible (%) 17 22 





Appendix Table A8. Full List of Candidate Variables for Composite Measure 
Does your practice have a system in place to routinely screen patients for: 
 Yes No 
Low health literacy □ □ 
Food insecurity □ □ 
Housing instability □ □ 
Utility needs □ □ 
Interpersonal violence □ □ 
Transportation needs □ □ 
Need for financial assistance with medical bills □ □ 
 
For your complex, high need patients, how often: 
 Never Sometimes Often Always 
Is a care manager involved in helping the 
patient coordinate care across clinicians □ □ □ □ 
Is a care manager involved in helping the 
patient adhere to the care plan □ □ □ □ 
Is a non-clinician (e.g. health coach)  
involved in supporting health risk 
modification 
□ □ □ □ 
Is a non-clinician (e.g. health coach)  
involved in supporting medication 
adherence 
□ □ □ □ 
Are patients stratified into different 






When your complex, high need patients are hospitalized, which of the following are routinely in place to facilitate their 
discharge? 
 Yes No 
Referral to community health-related social services □ □ 
Communication with patient within 72 hours of discharge  □ □ 
Home visit after discharge □ □ 
Discharge summaries sent to primary care clinician within 
72 hours of discharge □ □ 
Standardized process to reconcile multiple medications □ □ 
 
Does your practice use any of the information below for internal use/quality improvement efforts targeting complex, high 
need patients? 
 Yes No 
Hospital admissions or readmissions □ □ 
Emergency department use □ □ 
Medication adherence □ □ 
 




Does your practice collect patient-reported measures of Patient activation (e.g. self-efficacy for 








Considering the physicians and staff in your practice, how many: 
 None Some Most All 
Routinely engage in shared decision-making □ □ □ □ 
 
How often do clinicians in your practice have access to the following when they need it? 
 Never Sometimes Often Always 
Notification that a patient was admitted 
to a local hospital 
□ □ □ □ 
 
Does your practice manage information about individual clinician performance for internal quality improvement on use of 




Does your practice currently use any culturally tailored programs or interventions?  For example, a practice might provide 
culturally tailored programming to address preventive services in the Hispanic community with bilingual community health 
workers. 
* Yes 










Ratio SE P Val 
Fixed Effects, N=415,663    
Race (ref. group white)    
Black 0.967 0.017 0.067 
Other 0.967 0.026 0.214 
Median Income 0.999 0.000 0.008 
Frailty 1.071 0.003 <0.001 
HCC Score 1.483 0.004 <0.001 
Random Effects 
Practice var(_cons), 
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